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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the classical just war tradition, legitimate authority is central to the just use of force. This 
tradition is consistent with the argument, as posited by Augustine and Aquinas, that 
legitimate authority is the guiding principle through which all standards of justice flow. With 
its exclusive right to employ force, legitimate authority is classically viewed in a positivist 
light: the securing of peace and the uplifting of good. Although conceived before the advent 
of the modern state system, the just war tradition has historically been used to attribute 
justice to the action of states. The statist paradigm of international relations is, however, 
being challenged by non-state actors engaging in the use of force with more frequency than 
that of states. Recent just war scholarship has attempted a reconciliation of the authority 
principle framed by Walzer’s political community. These applications have, unfortunately, 
diluted the efficacy of one of just war’s most important principles. Through an empirical 
examination using the standards of authority espoused by Augustine, Aquinas and others, this 
paper will attempt to build a framework for further debate in an effort to update the just war 
tradition to meet changes in international relations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-state actors (NSAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the use of armed 
force.  The frequency with which NSAs engage in the use of force is alarming.  Previously 
held realist observations that states have a monopoly on the use of force have quickly and 
tragically been undermined.  Twenty-first century warfare is unique in that for the first time 
since the advent of the modern state system, the threat of real attack and a disturbance of 
international order do not come solely from other states.  As the tragedy of 9/11 made clear, 
warfare has a new face.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are but one example of the 
realities of modern warfare.  In each arena, the United States is fighting against an NSA, al-
Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.1  Interestingly in these wars, the US employs 
more private military contractors, 19% more to be exact, than uniformed personnel.2  Here 
we have an example of an NSA fighting an NSA.  Consider also Hezbollah and Hamas.  In 
the July 2006 conflict, Hezbollah launched some 150 rockets per day into Israel.3  While 
Hezbollah is an officially recognized political party in Lebanon, the use of force in the July 
War was not representative of Lebanon as a state.  Hamas is in a similar situation.  While 
Hamas is a political party, the Palestinian Authority is technically not a state.  Yet, Hamas 
                                                 
1
 While the Taliban was the ruling political entity in Afghanistan, it was not widely 
recognized as a state on par with other states in the international system.  With the exception 
of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan, the Taliban was considered a terrorist organization. 
CNN, Taliban tightens grip, seeks world recognition, 
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9809/28/afghanistan.01/index.html. 
 
2 Congressional Research Service, “DoD Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background 
and Analysis,” 2 July 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf 
 
3
 Eric A. Heinze and Brent J. Steele, eds., Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and 
the Just War Tradition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.  
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has in the past engaged in the use of force, sometimes initiating conflict.  The overarching 
reality in terms of international security and the ethics of warfare is that these entities are 
demonstrating a number of state-like military capabilities.  The frequency and scale with 
which NSAs engage in the use of force is an alarming reality of a changing international 
system.  Stability and order previously provided by balance of power (BOP) politics and the 
threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) are being undermined by entities which do not 
play by these rules or respond in kind to these threats.  As the label implies, NSAs operate 
largely independent of the sovereign jurisdiction of a state and are often motivated by 
ideology rather than state-like pragmatism.   
This paper is an examination of the ethics of war, specifically in an era dominated by 
NSAs engaging in the use of force.  The prevailing moral vocabulary about war remains 
decidedly statist.  Clearly this is a problem; our current notions of morality in war are taken 
to apply to the conduct of states.  Given this reality, how are these state-centric normative 
frameworks impacted by the presence of non-states?  As classically conceived, these 
normative frameworks seek to place moral limitations upon those who attempt to use armed 
force.  The conception of these frameworks predates the advent of the modern state system.  
In this regard, these precepts should be applicable to non-states.  This is a foolish assumption.  
Although developed before the arrival of states as we know them, these normative 
frameworks applied to the prevailing governmental authority of the time.4  The application of 
authority has thus been transitive.  A testament to the strength of an accepted framework 
limiting the use of force is its adaptability.  These conceptions of ethics and morality have 
been highly adaptive while, for the most part, retaining their efficacy.  The current debate 
                                                 
4
 Greek city-states, monarchies, etc. 
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over NSAs and the use of force is a major challenge to the integral role these frameworks 
must play in a conversation about ethics, morality and modern warfare.  Clearly, there is 
something inherently important in the relationship between authority and the use of force.  
The idea that the prevailing governmental authority represents the only entity legitimately 
able to use force has survived.  In fact, it has been codified as such in international law.  Why 
is this so and what does it tell us about the modern debate?  What I aim to suggest here is that 
the relationship of authority and the use of force goes well beyond a surface-level analysis of 
sovereignty.  There are, as I see it, important moral responsibilities wrapped up in the 
legitimate authority to use force.  This paper is an attempt to square the realities of modern 
warfare with the efficacy of classic normative frameworks limiting the use of force. 
The prevailing normative framework seeking to place moral limitations on war for 
those who would undertake it is commonly referred to as the “just war tradition”.  It is 
important, from the start, to distinguish between two different but often confused terms: just 
war theory and the just war tradition.  A just war theory is a moral doctrine about the use of 
force.  Just war theories can take many forms: secular, divine, legal, philosophical, and so on.  
By contrast, the just war tradition is the sum of the multifaceted theories and is fragmented 
and dominated by none in particular.  However, divine, and particularly Catholic, theories are 
the most widely cited.  Although defining what he calls “the war convention”, Michael 
Walzer conceptualizes the heart of the just war tradition as a “set of articulated norms, 
customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and 
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reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgments of military conduct…”5  As was mentioned 
above, this tradition is quite old.  The just war tradition has a rich history that has evolved 
over the centuries and represents an amalgam of many different just war theories.  Alex J. 
Bellamy describes the just war tradition as a protracted normative conversation about 
legitimacy in the use of force which has been “adapted and refined by numerous subsequent 
commentators, each advancing related but distinct normative theories about the ethics of 
war.”6  The result of centuries of conversation is that the tradition has crystallized around a 
number of accepted principles and theories.  What emerges from this nearly two-thousand-
year-old conversation are three over-arching principles limiting the use of force: jus ad 
bellum, the resort to war; jus in bello, the actual conduct of war; and recently jus post bellum, 
justice after war.7   
Critics of a just war often ask a penetrating question: “If one is abhorred by war, why 
outline principles that seek to morally justify it?”8  It is a fair question.  The truth is that most 
just war theorists dislike war.  Yet, just war theorists share with realists the ontological 
assumption that international life is essentially anarchic and dangerous.  Unfortunately, war 
is a central feature of human civilization and will occur in spite of our feeble efforts to 
prevent it.  This critical reality makes it necessary to adopt moral guidelines limiting the use 
                                                 
5
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), 44.  Indeed, Walzer’s conversation about just war is 
considered one of the great secular arguments about morality in war. 
 
6
 Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 4.   
 
7
 Even more recently, just war scholars have been engaged in a conversation about the ethics 
of war termination which is a different ethical dilemma than justice after war. 
 
8
 Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 3.  
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of force for those who would undertake it.  War is tragic and should be undertaken as 
infrequently and humanely as possible.  Yet, war is also, at times, necessary.  Thus the 
employment of force needs to be limited by accepted moral principles.  This is the role of the 
just war tradition.  This is also why the tradition’s enduring efficacy must be maintained.   
A fundamental rethinking of the just war tradition must occur.  Current conceptions 
of the just war tradition need to accommodate new and disparate international security 
challenges in order to update what remains an important framework for the ethical and 
practical use of force.  The just war tradition has reached a critical juncture.  At this seminal 
point, the possibilities for its adaptation are rich and many.  What must be retained, however, 
in any conversation about the applicability of these principles to NSAs is the pivotal 
relationship between the responsibility of order, security and the use of force.  While NSAs 
do demonstrate state-like military capabilities, I maintain they fail to advance the central 
principles of national security and political order.  As I engage in the rethinking of the 
principle of legitimate authority, I will seek to elucidate how this principle can be applied to 
NSAs with the moral requirement of responsibility to maintain security and order.   
My argument will proceed with a number of central presuppositions about 
international relations, security, and war.  The examination of the classic just war tradition as 
conceptualized by its early thinkers will reflect these principles.   
First, I maintain that security and order are the primary objectives of international 
politics.  This is a decidedly realist assessment of international relations and the behavior of 
states.  Yet, in contrast to what I will spell out in Chapter 1, the just war tradition should and 
does reflect this reality.  The dueling principles of order and security ought to be of primary 
importance in international relations.  Security and order represent the intersection of 
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morality and pragmatism, leading to a minimalist and effective twenty-first century just war 
theory.  The argument within is based on the assumption, grounded in classical just war 
thought, that the basis of legitimate authority “acknowledges that governments and law are 
the foundation of the good life.”9  The presumption of order and security necessitates that 
war must sometimes be waged by a legitimate authority in the defense of such; this is a moral 
concept.  Pragmatically, a strong political order “is the basis for experiencing security and 
justice in everyday life.”10  Security is the pragmatic side of this intersection in just war 
because it represents an opportunity for millions of people around the globe to better their 
families and rebuild their societies.  Twenty-first century just war must return to its roots to 
advocate and defend political order and security as provided by states. 
Second, a just war theory for the twenty-first century must be minimalistic in order to 
be effective.  Historically, just war derived value from its realistic assessment of war and 
politics while at the same time advancing moral ideals.  In order to appeal to policy makers 
today, just war should begin with the premise that the state has certain ethical and practical 
responsibilities which are not found in NSAs.  The restricted notion of just war theory 
advocated by contemporary scholars is ineffective for dealing with twenty-first century 
threats.  Two questions should guide policy makers today: “what is our responsibility to our 
citizens?” and “what is our responsibility to the international system?”11  The second of these 
may be the most important in terms of the order states can bring to the international system.  
                                                 
9
 Eric Patterson, Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle Against 
Contemporary Threats (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 9.  
 
10
 Ibid., 9.   
 
11
 Ibid., 9.   
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This paper argues for a twenty-first century just war theory rooted in the classical 
notions of national security and political order.  From this foundation, we can establish that 
the political ethic of responsibility to maintain these is found in states with the obligation to 
meet the challenges of twenty-first century threats.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE JUST WAR TRADITION:  
CONTEMPORARY (MIS)UNDERSTANDINGS 
The just war tradition is an adaptive and accepted centuries-old conversation about 
moral limits on the use of armed force.  As such, it has a rich history composed of a 
multitude of separate and distinct theories about the ethics of war.  I mentioned above that 
these theories are representative of a number of unique approaches to this conversation-
secular, divine, legal, philosophical and so on.  In order to fully appreciate the breadth of 
work on this topic, it is helpful to start with current conceptions of the just war tradition 
before considering its historical origins.   
With certain slight variations, the just war tradition centers on the following set of 
accepted principles, first concerning jus ad bellum (the resort to war):  
1.  Legitimate Authority: The individual or body authorizing the use of force must be 
a duly constituted authority widely recognized as having the right to wage war.  This 
generally refers to the representative of a sovereign political entity; states, today.  Also, the 
authorization to use force implies the ability to control and cease the use of force.1  
2.  Just Cause: The use of force may be employed for one or more just causes, 
sufficiently grave to warrant the resort to war.2  The most common casus belli include: the 
punishment of evil, recovery of stolen property, writing a wrong, and self-defense against 
                                                 
1
 James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of 
Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 38.   
 
2
 Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 5.   
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aggression.  Also included, especially in classic conceptions of just cause, is the 
responsibility for defense of the common good.3 
3.  Right Intention: The war must be waged in accord with the just cause and not for 
an ulterior or hidden reason most notably, territorial aggrandizement, intimidation, or 
coercion.  Classically conceived, right intention lists evils to be avoided in war as well as the 
more positive end: the pursuit of peace.4   
These three principles represent the traditional just war criteria.  They are 
deontological in nature as they “impose duties on the person or people having ultimate moral 
responsibility for the good of the political community and for good relations among political 
communities.”5  In addition to these three central principles, jus ad bellum has grown to 
include other prudential, or supportive, criteria.  It is important to note, however, that these 
supporting criteria are not to be prioritized in the initial consideration of the morality of the 
resort to force.  They are, by nature, consequentialist-providing a commentary on the wisdom 
of the resort to force in a war which has already met the other criteria.  In other words, these 
supporting criteria, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to gauge the justness of a given 
war.  The three most common prudential criteria are:  
4.  Proportionality of Ends: The overall good expected from war must be greater than 
the harm done as a result of war. 
                                                 
3
 James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust, 38.  Some commentators justify preemptive and 
even preventive force through this understanding. 
 
4
 Ibid., 38.   
 
5
 Ibid., 36. 
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5.  Last Resort: As part of the determination to use force, all other non-violent means 
must have been exhausted.  This principle is commonly and wrongly argued to be the most 
important of all jus ad bellum principles.  In the classic just war literature, there is no 
grounding for this assumption.  Despite this, the presumption against force, as it is often 
called, prevails in contemporary Catholic and indeed many secular circles.   
6.  Reasonable Hope of Success: A war should not be waged unless the initiator’s 
goals can reasonably be expected to be achieved.   
As this paper will primarily concern the principle of legitimate authority specifically 
and just ad bellum more generally, a brief list of principles found in jus in bello and jus post 
bellum will be enough.6 The jus in bello criteria include: proportionality of means and 
noncombatant immunity.  Concerning jus post bellum, there is little consensus on these core 
principles.  Some of the most commonly argued principles include: rights vindication, 
elimination of unjust gains, punishment and demilitarization and political rehabilitation.7 
The historical development of the just war tradition will be considered in more detail 
below.  As will be made clear, just war theories have been useful for nearly 2,000 years as 
guidelines for both philosophers and practitioners in their thinking about war.  From Cicero 
to Walzer and the varying approaches in between, just war scholars have made lasting 
contributions because they either developed or adapted just war in a particularly formative 
context.  Indeed, past just war scholars adapted the tradition into a practical policy guideline 
                                                 
6
 My aim here is to show that, with the exception of jus post bellum, there is wide 
acceptability of the principles for the resort to war and the conduct of war.  Even across the 
varying traditions of just war theories, these principles are recognized and accepted.   
 
7
 Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 7.   
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for thinking through the dilemmas of international security.  One eminent example is the 
transitive nature of the legitimate authority principle.  Conceived at a time when Greek city-
states were the primary governmental authority, “the proper authority to wage war…has 
typically been the purview of whatever conception of legitimate authority has prevailed at a 
given time.”8  Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of late twentieth and twenty-first 
century just war scholarship.  Most of the recent applications of just war theory, while 
attempting a reconciliation of the principle of legitimate authority, have instead tended to be 
doctrinaire, quasi-pacifistic and generally unhelpful in thinking about twenty-first century 
conflict.  It has been, in effect, out of step with the historical tradition of legitimate authority 
and a failure to keep the tradition true to itself.   
There are, as I see it, at least two problems with contemporary just war scholarship.  
First, and most importantly, divine and secular commentary on just war usually falls into two 
categories.  This commentary either a) distorts the just war principles in such a way that they 
are stripped of any force or meaning and are no longer representative of the classic tradition 
or b) eschews them altogether in favor of a just war theory based on humanism or rights-
based cosmopolitanism.  Second, contemporary just war scholarship has failed to adequately 
accommodate or deal with changes in twenty-first century warfare.  Both divine and secular 
writings are guilty of this.  To illustrate these failings, I will examine important 
misconceptions of the just war tradition in general and problems with the idea of legitimate 
authority more specifically.  
 
 
                                                 
8
 Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 10.   
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“Checklist”Just War Theory 
One of the most remarkably egregious examples of failing to account for the 
classically conceived notion of the tradition itself has been the adoption of “checklist” just 
war theory.9  Checklist just war theory is essentially a legalistic ticking off of the principles 
one by one.  The result is that if one cannot check off all of the principles, then the war in 
question is not just.  Most commonly, this approach is applied to jus ad bellum.  Also, recent 
just war scholarship has assigned more and more weight to the prudential criteria, sometimes 
inappropriately giving priority to one or more of these principles over the original, and most 
critical, criteria.  For example, in the opening paragraph of an oft-cited cosmopolitan just war 
article, the author states that jus ad bellum, traditionally understood, teaches that “a war is 
just if, and only if, the harms it causes are outweighed by the goods it brings about…”10  To 
begin a list of jus ad bellum criteria with the proportionality of ends principle is incorrect.  
Even when this does not happen, the net result is that the prudential criteria are judged as 
equal principles in the jus ad bellum.  When checklist just war theory is thus applied, the jus 
ad bellum principles number six, making it a tall order to justify a war.  One of the many 
examples of this is an essay written just prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  In examining 
whether or not the U.S. should invade Iraq, the author exhaustively considers each jus ad 
bellum criteria (prudential included) and assigns them equal weight in this moral exercise.  
Among his many reasons for deeming the invasion to be unjust, the author concludes the 
                                                 
9
 Eric Patterson, Just War Thinking, 27.   
 
10
 Cecile Fabre, “Cosmopolitanism, just war theory and legitimate authority,” International 
Affairs 84, no. 5 (2008): 963.   
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U.S. “was far from the moment of last resort.”11  This suggests that even if all other criteria 
would have been acceptable, the violation of this one principle is, by itself, enough to 
question the justness of the resort to force.  I challenge this approach to just war theory.   
Presumption Doctrine 
Another contemporary mutation of the just war tradition is the “presumption 
doctrine”.  As I mentioned above, the presumption doctrine prevails in contemporary 
Catholic and many secular just war circles.  The presumption doctrine is the most widely 
cited misconception of the just war tradition and most likely contributes to mutations such as 
checklist just war theory.  If not for the previously-held notion of presumption against the use 
of force, checklist just war theory might not have been adopted.  The doctrine of a 
presumption against war is exactly what it implies.  Proponents of this approach argue that 
first and foremost, there is an inherent presupposition that war is evil and should be avoided 
at all costs.  Those who adhere to this understanding wrongly trumpet that the just war 
tradition begins with a strong presumption against the use of force.  For them, the just war 
tradition then establishes the conditions and principles which must be met for this 
presumption to be overridden while also limiting the harms of war.12  The reason for this is a 
quasi-cosmopolitan argument about the preservation of human dignity and human rights.13   
One of the most important benchmarks in the development of the presumption 
doctrine and contemporary conceptions of just war was the publication of a 1978 article in 
                                                 
11
 Patterson, Just War Thinking, 27.   
 
12
 Eileen P. Flynn, How Just is the War On Terror? A Question of Morality (Mahwah: Paulist 
Press, 2007), 20.  
 
13
 Johnson, The War to Oust, 30.  More on Cosmopolitanism below. 
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the journal Theological Studies by James F. Childress.  Childress argued that killing in war is 
morally problematic.  In order to do so, justification would be needed to overrule a 
presumption against war: “because it is prima facie wrong to injure or kill others, such acts 
demand justification.”14  For Childress, the just war criteria provide this justification.15 
Following the structure of Childress’s argument very closely, the U.S. Catholic Bishops 
published a 1983 pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace.  This letter described Catholic just 
war theory “as beginning with a general presumption against war and represented the jus ad 
bellum criteria as guidance for determining whether this presumption should be overruled in 
particular cases or not.”16  This new just war theory, wrongly made into something different 
from the classical idea, was the result of two important exogenous factors prevailing at the 
time.  The first was the very real threat of nuclear war.  The buildup of nuclear arms 
undertaken by the Reagan administration had created MAD.  An opposition to the use of 
nuclear weapons by the Catholic Bishops dovetailed nicely into a presumption against war in 
general.  Second, there was a strong pacifistic sentiment among the members of the drafting 
committee and among the Catholic faithful more generally.17  Appealing directly to the wider 
Catholic audience and in a volatile international climate, this conception of just war began to 
gain traction.   
                                                 
14
 James F. Childress, “Just War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions 
of Their Criteria,” Theological Studies 39, (1978). 
 
15
 James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust, 28.   
 
16
 Ibid., 26.  
 
17
 Ibid., 28.   
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In order to mark the ten-year anniversary of the earlier pastoral letter, the Catholic 
Bishops issued a new statement.  The 1993 publication was entitled The Harvest of Justice is 
Sown in Peace. While recognizing that the imminent threat of nuclear war was not driving 
just war conceptions in this publication, the Catholic Bishops repeated the call for a 
presumption against the use of force.  Arguing for the need to update the just war tradition to 
reflect the challenges of the present and future, the Bishops once again wrongly offered the 
following interpretation of the tradition:  
The just-war tradition begins with a strong presumption against 
the use of force and then establishes the conditions when this 
presumption may be overridden for the sake of preserving the 
kind of peace which protects human dignity and human 
rights.18   
 
Ten years after the original conception of a presumption against force, the doctrine 
had been solidified in Catholic thought on the issue.  While the threat of nuclear destruction 
played no part in this letter, the framework for the argument had already been set.  Seeking to 
find a middle ground between the shrinking numbers of proponents of traditional Catholic 
just war thinking and “those Catholics who…had come to regard their faith as opposing war 
altogether…” the presumption doctrine was established as the central Catholic position on 
the issue.19  The Second Vatican Council established a Catholic peace tradition which erased 
the distinction of the higher morality of the religious and the lower morality of the laity.  
Instead, this new tradition called for the “spirituality of the religious life to be expanded 
                                                 
18
 “The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace,” unpublished manuscript for the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, November 17, 1993, 5.   
 
19
 James Turner Johnson, “Just War As It Was and Is,” First Things, no. 1 (2005).   
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among the laity…” essentially extending the “traditional non-involvement in war of the 
religious to all faithful Catholics.”20 
In 2002, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops again issued a statement, this time 
on the proposed invasion of Iraq.  Once again, this statement began by defining the just war 
tradition as a set of “strict conditions for overriding the strong presumption against military 
force.”21  In addition to repeating the wrong presupposition of the just war tradition, the 
Bishops’ premature judgment of the Iraq war was distorted and selective.  The Bishops used 
this statement to reject preemption and regime change, “to stress the legal necessity of a U.N. 
sanction for military action and to offer the judgment that military force could not be used 
against Iraq without indiscriminate and disproportionate destruction.”22  This offering was 
clearly out of step with the criteria found in the classic just war tradition.  Yet, the Bishops 
still attempted to retain the framework of the classic just war vocabulary.  Furthermore, this 
letter was a far cry from the statements offered in 1983 and 1993 which at least listed the 
most important just war criteria.   
What is clearly shown in these examples is the growing mutation of the just war 
theory toward a presumption against the use of force.  Indeed, this idea has become 
increasingly dominant in just war conversations.  For example, even President Obama got it 
wrong.  In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Obama said that the tradition of the just war 
                                                 
20
 Ibid.  
 
21
 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. “Statement on Iraq,” November 13, 2002. 
http://www.ctbi.org.uk/intaff/iraq/uscath01.htm, quoted in James Turner Johnson, The War to 
Oust, 31.   
 
22
 Ibid., 32.   
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seeks to regulate war, justifying it only when certain preconditions are met, the first of which 
is last resort.23  The official Catholic commentary on the issue has listed the requirements for 
a possible exception so restrictively and prejudicially that they have become virtually 
impossible to meet.  In such cases that they could be met using the still wrongly conceived 
checklist theory, the Bishops seem to have developed standards of their own by which to 
judge the resort to war.  In effect, the presumption against war has turned into a functional 
pacifism.24  As will be shown below, a functional pacifism is inconsistent with the classical 
Catholic just war tradition. 
Basing his judgment in the classical just war tradition, John Hymers argues for the 
preservation of a presumption against force in the tradition.  Hymers couches his analysis in 
terms of a destabilization of order in the international system.  Ironically, just war scholars in 
defense of a return to the classical interpretation of the just war tradition also argue that the 
principles of order and security and their preservation dictate that the use of force be 
employed judiciously but without the overriding restrictiveness of the presumption doctrine.  
Further, these same scholars argue that a presumption against war is, in fact, not found in 
readings of the classical just war doctrine.  Nevertheless, Hymers argues the opposite.   
Hymers ultimately shows that, after a consideration of the terms used in the debate 
over presumption, violence “in the scholastic tradition that nurtured the just war theory, is 
                                                 
23
 Los Angeles Times,“Text of Barack Obama Nobel Prize acceptance lecture”, Top of the 
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understood as disordered force.”25  As disordered force, violence is contrary to justice and 
rational order.  Since a just war, as classically understood, aims at order, it is contrary to 
reason that it may be disordered.  Thus, the just war tradition is best described as containing a 
presumption against violence: “a just war is waged to counter violence, and a just war may 
not itself use violence…” understood as disordered force.26  The just war may only be waged 
on the presumption that violence be opposed and “waged such that is eschews acts of 
violence.”27 
In secular circles, the presumption doctrine prevails as well.  Nick Fotion attempts to 
formulate an alternative theory of just war more suited to deal with nation vs. non-nation 
wars.  Fotion argues that traditional conceptions of just war theory are not appropriate for 
dealing with twenty-first century conflict.  Fotion’s secular ethics-based discourse focuses on 
the universally-held ethical principles and possible exceptions to them.  He argues that 
“certain ethical rules are universal.”28  Chief among these, according to Fotion, is that killing 
and violence are wrong.  In addition to inverting the principles of the jus ad bellum, Cecile 
Fabre also subscribes to the presumption doctrine.  Fabre argues that restrictions on the rights 
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to legitimately wage war were developed out of the shared principle that killing and violence 
are wrong “and [their] occurrence must be restricted as far as possible.”29 
Discipleship Theory 
The Catholic Bishops have failed to account for changes in twenty-first century 
warfare.  Emerging just war scholarship is just beginning to seriously attempt to square the 
classical tradition, suited more for state vs. state conflict, with conflict that oftentimes does 
not include a state at all.30  Sometimes, however, just war scholars conclude that the classical 
just war tradition, when faced with the problem of NSAs, appears to be rendered obsolete.31  
One such approach is called the discipleship theory.  This argument is offered by Daniel M. 
Bell, Jr. in his 2006 article “Can A War Against Terror Be Just? Or, What Is Just War Good 
For?”.  Bell argues that the real challenge facing the just war tradition today stems from 
conflicting accounts of the tradition’s end or purpose.  The prevailing answer to the question 
of the tradition’s purpose, according to Bell, is that it first and foremost serves the state.32  
Subsequently, the tradition is primarily concerned with defining the moral responsibilities of 
states and politicians who manage them.  Thus, the just war tradition is understood as a 
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theory of statecraft.33  The trouble with this understanding, Bell argues, is that presupposing 
the existence of states and the relations between them is called into question in an age of 
NSAs.  In other words, when facing an NSA, the classical tradition as an instrument of 
statecraft appears to be rendered obsolete.  Bell then formulates an alternative answer to the 
question of the tradition’s purpose and end: the answer begins with the church.   
The starting point for this argument is medieval just war theory.  After an 
examination of the prevailing thought on just war at the time, Bell finds that medieval just 
war theory was not a theory of statecraft.  Rather, it was an ecclesial discipline, the ends of 
which were the edification of the body of Christ.34  Bell is right to claim that the just war 
tradition is much more than a checklist of criteria.  He is also correct in that the classic just 
war tradition, as formulated in the ancient church, sought to discern certain virtues on the 
ethics of conflict.  What follows from Bell’s argument is that these virtues were made 
possible through the practices of discipleship.35  The Christian community is therefore 
charged with the task of spreading the virtues of charity, fortitude and hospitality.  Christian 
disciples, as other-directed, are much better suited to these tasks than a modern nation-state 
using just war as an instrument of statecraft.  Just war as an instrument of Christian 
discipleship is thus driven by a love that desires to bestow the benefits of a just peace upon 
the enemy.36  Ultimately, Bell argues that in a time of terror, just war’s primary goal should 
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be the formation of disciples.37  I offer this as an example of one attempt to square the just 
war tradition with the novelties of twenty-first century conflict.  What Bell does correctly is 
look back at classical conceptions of the tradition in order to formulate a just war theory for 
the twenty-first century.  However, his reading of the early tradition is, I will argue, incorrect.   
Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitan morality is generally characterized by the notions of individualism, 
egalitarianism and universalism.  All humans have the right to the freedoms and resources 
they need to live a minimally flourishing life.  To cosmopolitans, these are human rights held 
by all regardless of where they reside and are inherent to humans as such.  In order to lead a 
minimally flourishing life, two things are necessary: autonomy and well-being.38  Autonomy 
is the opportunity for individuals to make “meaningful, identity-conferring choices as to how 
to lead their lives.”39  Well-being means that an individual should not be “subject to constant 
physical or psychological suffering, be well fed, be warm, etc.”40  The intersection of 
cosmopolitanism and just war theory comes with regard to the state’s authority to wage war.  
To begin with, Fabre challenges the notion that states are imbued with the authority to wage 
war simply by virtue of being a state.  The idea that states are in the unique position to 
legitimately use armed force because they are the highest authority, duly constituted and 
widely recognized is inconsistent with Fabre’s cosmopolitan philosophy.  For Fabre, the 
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authority to wage war comes exclusively from the use of force as a mechanism for enforcing 
cosmopolitan moral norms, rather than a mechanism for resolving interstate disputes.41   
With this consideration in mind, Fabre argues that the principle of legitimate 
authority is unnecessary.  Because the only grounding for a state’s authority to wage war is 
found in the defense of cosmopolitan moral norms (read: human rights), any use of force 
which does not support this end is null and void.  If the state is unable or unwilling to protect 
the fundamental human rights of its population and those of individuals in other states, the 
right to wage war reverts to the individual and ultimate possessor of those inherent human 
rights.  The over-all line of reasoning in this argument is that the principle of legitimate 
authority is unnecessary.  Since it traditionally applies to states in a manner inconsistent with 
the only legitimate reason to wage war, defense of human rights, its exclusivity to states 
should be scrapped.42  Ultimately, this argument attempts to bring NSAs into the just war 
tradition, but in a rather logically flawed way.  Attempting to legitimize the efforts of an 
NSA to defend cosmopolitan moral norms while scrapping the basic structure under which 
they could, conceivably, achieve this legitimacy is logically problematic.  As a moral 
structure seeking to provide commentary on the ethical use of force, the just war tradition has 
survived for nearly two-millennia.  To question its eminent practicality in the face of yet 
another challenge is a failure to appreciate its proven transitive nature.  The pursuit of 
universal cosmopolitan moral norms in the form of individuals militarily defending their own 
human rights is an invitation to chaos.  The end result would be the destabilization of order 
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and security, principles which the classic just war tradition set out to ensure.  It is one of the 
purposes of this paper to make this clear.  
Ethical Rules and Possible Exceptions: Two Theories of Just War 
The starting point of the ethical rules argument is similar to that found in discipleship 
theory: classically conceived, the just war tradition is not well suited for dealing with twenty-
first century conflict.  Also, this argument proposes to scrap the traditional just war criteria or 
at least develop a new set of criteria for dealing with NSAs.  As offered by Nick Fotion, the 
ethical rules approach then argues that it “makes sense to create a second just war theory to 
deal…” with this type of warfare.43   
As stated above, Fotion’s central premise is a just war theory based on ethical 
principles, rules and possible exceptions.  As such, Fotion approaches an examination of the 
just war tradition not as a political scientist but as a philosopher.44  For Fotion, certain ethical 
rules are universal.  Chief among these is: do not kill.  Yet, there may be situations in which 
there is a pressing need to override our most basic notions of human ethical behavior.  Within 
the general context of this ethical commandment, exceptions are made based on the 
application of four criteria: good reasons, last resort, proportionality, and proper 
authorization.45  Notice the similarity to the just war tradition.  Indeed, Fotion argues that 
exceptions theory in the military field is known as just war theory.  However, the most 
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common version of the theory addresses situations where two nations threaten to go to war 
with each other.46  Thus, the theory is primarily a nation vs. nation construction.  Because of 
this, there are serious problems with the application of exceptions to the rule of do not kill as 
they concern wars of states vs. non-states.  The first problem concerns the nature of just 
war’s principles in general.  Fotion argues that the principles are stated so loosely that there 
is a great deal of play in them when it comes to their application.47  They have lost their 
moral and practical efficacy.  Another problem has to do with the state vs. state nature of 
traditional just war.  Unfortunately, the just war tradition does not give us a clear sense of 
how to act when the threat of war against a state is generated by an NSA.48  The theory 
employed in state vs. state wars is clearly of a different nature than the theory needed to 
apply to wars including an NSA.  Thus, the domain of war should be divided into two sub-
domains: traditional just war theory and irregular just war theory.49   
Couched in terms of the principle of legitimate authority, Fotion illustrates his 
argument further: legitimate authority needs to be modified to take into account the special 
conditions of a state vs. non-state conflict.50  For example, in state vs. state conflicts, 
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authorities that legitimize war and undertake war legitimately can be easily identified.51  In 
any situation in which a state is about to enter a war, the question asked is: was/is the war 
properly authorized?  Yet, in irregular wars, this question has no place.  For example, a 
terrorist organization may have a leader, but that leader has no legitimacy.52  If a terrorist 
organization, guerilla group, or other irregular group becomes involved in a war with a state, 
it makes no sense to ask these groups to satisfy the legitimate authority principle.  The state 
involved still has to satisfy the legitimate authority principle, but not the NSA.53  Thus, it 
makes no sense to ask these groups to satisfy the legitimate authority principle because they 
cannot.   
Fotion’s conclusion is a very controversial one.  His argument that asking NSAs to 
satisfy the legitimate authority principle is a fool’s errand may lead to the conclusion that 
these actors are getting off scot-free.  However, Fotion argues that since they do not have to 
be a legitimate authority to engage in conflict, they are subject to preventive war by a 
legitimate authority.  NSA military plans are non-contingent.  They are not planning military 
action just in case a certain thing should happen.  Rather, their plans represent “the first step 
in a process that, eventually, will lead to violence.  So they are in effect at war already with 
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the nation they are opposing.”54  Ultimately, the reason for two just war theories is that is 
easier “to be clear about what one is judging when the judgments concerning two kinds of 
wars are separated into regular and irregular theory.”55  One of the biggest problems with 
Fotion’s line of reasoning is that, essentially, he proposes an alternative theory of just war in 
order to clearly de-legitimize an NSA’s authority to wage war.  However, the classic just war 
tradition is quite capable of this.  The best way to strengthen just war’s basic tenets is to stay 
true to the parsimonious theory of legitimate authority as it is classically understood.  
Legitimate Authority, (Mis)understood 
In addition to misunderstanding the broad purpose, aim and enduring nature of the 
just war tradition, contemporary scholars also have widely different readings of the principle 
of legitimate authority.  Above, I have included reference to this in my discussion of a couple 
scholars’ misunderstanding of the just war tradition more broadly.  It is necessary to examine 
the ways in which legitimate authority is contemporarily understood.  As with the just war 
tradition, I will then focus on how this principle is classically understood by both secular and 
divine figures who contributed to its rise. 
The conception of authority in the just war tradition is complex.  Contributing to this 
complexity is a lack of authoritativeness in the use of its modifying term.   Right authority, 
legitimate authority and sovereign authority are all ways in which the concept of authority 
has been labeled.56  The diversity in terminology can lead to diversity in understanding.  For 
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example, contemporary secular conceptions limit authority to mean: one with the authority to 
engage in the use of force must be a “duly constituted authority, widely recognized as 
having” this right.57  On the other hand, religious conceptions understand authority to mean 
that which is vested in the sovereign by God and used for the promotion of good.  A lack of 
consensus on definition has lead to a number of differing implications of authority.  In 
addition to this, contemporary scholars have lost sight of the principle’s centrality.  The 
unfortunate fade into definitional word-play has contributed to the fall of what was originally 
conceived as a central principle in the morality of war.58  Each of these problems will be 
considered in turn. 
First, competing definitions.  As mentioned above, inconsistent use of modifiers has 
given rise to competing definitions.  When referring to legitimate authority, our definition 
above is the most authoritative.  It is a benign, simplistic understanding of specific 
international actors and their right to wage war.  It is also inherently limiting.  Terms such as 
“duly constituted” and “widely recognized” imply that very few entities will meet this 
standard.  In fact, “duly constituted” has, at least in the modern sense, meant states.  Yet, 
post-modern international relations are dominated by conflict outside of the traditional inter-
state conception.   
Right authority is considerably less limiting in definition.  It has been defined thusly: 
“a people considering war must rely on some individual or body to effect the declaration of 
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war.”59  This definition is qualified by two essential attributes: “trust in the reliability of those 
who are giving orders and a conviction of their moral integrity.”60  This understanding allows 
us to incorporate actors outside of the traditional statist paradigm.  Realistically, we could 
incorporate an organized association of people with a political purpose who may or may not 
aspire to statehood, “or at least an [organization with a] wish to influence governance in a 
particular territory.”61 
Finally, a corollary concept, sovereign authority, further qualifies this debate.  
Sovereign authority notes that “the leader’s capability to act depends upon a perception, at 
least, of the capacity to act well.”62  Sovereign authority also means a person or community 
with no political superior.63  The authorization for a sovereign authority to use force implies 
the “ability to control and cease that use, that is, a well-constituted and efficient chain of 
command.”64   
In today’s complex world, the authority being claimed is often ambiguous, tenuous, 
and legally spurious.  Because of this, the concepts of right authority and sovereign authority 
are necessarily interrelated, complicating the understanding further.  In such cases of 
ambiguous authority (including but not limited to rigged elections, military takeovers, and 
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failed states), the sovereign authority, a person or community with no political superior, may 
not be able to claim to right authority, trust in reliability of those giving orders and the moral 
integrity of those claiming authority.  This is a deep and fundamental problem for the concept 
of authority.  Because of this, I will use the term legitimate authority.  I will not, however, be 
constrained in my analysis by any strict interpretations thus advanced.  Instead, as will be 
shown below, I will argue for an understanding of the principle which focuses on the broad 
themes of responsibility, security, and order as they are found in the classical just war 
tradition.  The important thing to take from competing definitions is that they allow us to 
begin the process of conceptualizing an understanding of authority which will enable 
theorists to account for international actors who challenge the statist paradigm.  Two 
important questions come to mind.  What kind of authority must an entity claim in order to 
wage war?  Under these conceptions of authority, is there room to incorporate non-state 
actors? 
In addition to misunderstanding the just war tradition broadly, many of the scholars 
above have also failed to account for the true nature of legitimate authority.  Two problems 
prevail.  The first is the tendency to attach clauses and limitations to the principle which have 
no grounding in classical readings.  The other fundamental problem is a relegation of 
legitimate authority to more of an afterthought in the just war hierarchy.  In its place, just 
cause and, increasingly, the prudential criteria of last resort have been elevated to the top of 
the list.   
As with contemporary misunderstandings of the just war tradition, both secular and 
divine sources are guilty of these two problems.  While the advancement of the presumption 
doctrine is perhaps the most important problem, the U.S. Catholic Bishops have also 
30 
 
contributed to problems with legitimate authority as well.  In their 1983 letter The Challenge 
of Peace, the Bishops listed just cause as the first requirement in jus ad bellum.  This is 
problematic since classical Catholic understandings of the tradition definitively list legitimate 
authority as the most important principle.  Ironically, the 1983 letter does define legitimate 
authority in line with classical Catholic interpretations: “In the Catholic tradition the use of 
force has always been joined to the common good: war must be declared by those with 
responsibility for public order.”65  To mark the 10 year anniversary of their 1983 letter, the 
Bishops issued The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace in 1993.  This time around, the 
principle of legitimate authority was moved to third on the list behind the new criteria of 
comparative justice.  Furthermore, legitimate authority was defined as: “only duly constituted 
public authorities may use deadly force or wage war.”66  In this sense, legitimate authority 
had been stripped of all ties to classical Catholic understandings and instead reflected the 
contemporary secular definition.  
Once again, in 2002, the Bishops issued a scathing indictment of the coming Iraq 
War.  After an exhaustive examination of all jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria, the 
Bishops declared the war unjust.  The 2002 statement interpreted legitimate authority to 
require “not only compliance with U.S. constitutional standards and broad national consensus 
but also some form of international sanction, which was then rephrased as action taking place 
within the framework of the United Nations.”67  Essentially, the classical conception of 
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legitimate authority as responsibility, order and security had been restated as a concept of 
legality “within the frame of the U.N. system.”68 
Nick Fotion’s “Two Theories of Just War” is guilty of both problems as well.  With 
regard to the first problem, Fotion’s examination of jus ad bellum incorporates the traditional 
as well as prudential criteria.  The problem is that legitimate authority, classically conceived 
as one of the most important principles, is listed last in his article, behind even the prudential 
criteria of likelihood of success and last resort.  Having inverted the classical just war 
principles, Fotion then advances the following definition of legitimate authority: “to start a 
war, a nation must see to it that the authorities assigned to war matters are the ones who 
actually get the war started.”69  This seems to reflect the widely cited contemporary 
understanding of “duly constituted” and “widely recognized”.  However, Fotion adds that 
while PMCs, political parties, religious groups and guerilla organizations are not typically 
thought to be legitimate authorities, a war started by them could be just if “one of these 
groups happens to be the legitimate authority for a nation.”70   
As I mentioned above, Fotion’s ultimate conclusion is that there is a need for an 
alternative just war theory, one which makes it easier “to be clear about what one is judging 
when the judgments concerning two kinds of wars are separated into regular and irregular 
theory.”71  One of the biggest problems with Fotion’s line of reasoning is that, essentially, he 
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proposes an alternative theory of just war in order to clearly de-legitimize an NSA’s authority 
to wage war.  However, the classic just war tradition is quite capable of this.  The best way to 
strengthen just war’s basic tenets is to stay true to the parsimonious theory of legitimate 
authority as it is classically understood. 
While I support Daniel Bell’s premise that we ought to look back on the classical just 
war tradition as a way forward, I question his ultimate conclusion that this tradition leads to 
the advancement of Christian virtues and the formation of Christian disciples.  Ironically, 
upon examining the classical just war tradition, Bell does not correct the interpretation of 
legitimate authority he advances early in his article.  He states that the concept of legitimate 
authority has been challenged by NSAs due to the fact the war on terror, in order to be 
effective, requires secrecy.  The problem is that such secrecy means that “no state could 
publicly make the case for the justness of a given war, with the result that its authority to 
wage war could never in fact be legitimated.”72  What Bell suggests here is what is known as 
the public declaration.  This is a qualification which is often added in the definition of 
legitimate authority.  It has only scarce foundation in the classical just war tradition and Bell 
fails to point that out.   
The public declaration qualification is often cited as being equal to the “duly 
constituted” or “widely recognized” authorization.  This argument states that in order to 
satisfy the principle of legitimate authority, the war must be authorized by a legitimate body, 
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usually the U.N.73  In proposing solutions to the failure of legitimate authority to account for 
the rise of PMCs, James Pattison suggests that the best possible solution is to reaffirm the 
importance of the principle of public declaration of war.  According to Pattison, this criterion 
holds that war “needs to be declared openly and in accordance with the constitutional and 
parliamentary conventions on waging war.”74  Legitimate authority, in practice, means that 
“war can be authorized only be certain institutions-in particular, by states themselves or by 
international institutions such as the U.N. Security Council.”75  Again, this is a modern 
conception.  The original understanding of legitimate authority does not support this 
interpretation.   
Finally, cosmopolitan morality, while severely compromising the efficacy of the just 
war tradition, does not distort the principle of legitimate authority.  Instead, theorists who 
support cosmopolitan ethics in war seem to develop a new interpretation of legitimate 
authority.  The problem, as I pointed out above, is that attempting to legitimize the efforts of 
an NSA to defend cosmopolitan moral norms while scrapping the basic structure under 
which they could, conceivably, achieve this legitimacy is logically problematic.  The pursuit 
of universal cosmopolitan moral norms in the form of individuals militarily defending their 
own human rights is an invitation to chaos.  The end result would be the destabilization of 
order and security, principles which the classic just war tradition set out to ensure.  What is 
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needed, is a parsimonious, efficacious, yet transitive modern just war theory rooted in the 
principles of the classic just war tradition.   
Cosmopolitan moral interpretations of the just war tradition have lead to some 
interesting commentary on the nexus between the role of the state and its authority to wage 
war.  Ultimately, what we see are arguments which attempt to discover what it is about states 
that gives them this authority.  If it can be found that this inherent characteristic is advanced 
by NSAs, then they must have the same right to engage in the use of force.  In perhaps one of 
the most well-known applications of legitimate authority to NSAs and in particular terrorist 
organizations, Andrew Valls argues that a terrorist organization could actually be constituted 
as a legitimate authority.  Valls argues that the inherent characteristic of a state which 
legitimates its use of force is essentially its claim to represent the interests and rights of its 
people.76  At a deeper level, what really matters is the plausibility of the claim to represent 
the interests and rights of the people.  Thus, if a terrorist organization claims to act on behalf 
of a people, and is widely seen by that people as legitimately doing so, the rest of us (states) 
should look on that organization as the legitimate authority for the purpose of engaging in 
violence on their behalf.77  The problem with this argument is that there is no easily devised 
quantifiable method to measure legitimacy this way.  As a result, it becomes very difficult 
both for an NSA to claim such legitimacy and for states to be able to prove that an NSA’s 
claims to that legitimacy are false.   
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In a similar vein, Michael Walzer, perhaps the premier secular commentator on just 
war, argues in favor of the “political community” interpretation of legitimate authority.  
States are morally valuable because it is within states that citizens can build their own 
political community.  Thus the state provides “an arena within which freedom can be fought 
for and (sometimes) won.”78  The interpretation is that this is the moral basis for states’ right 
to resort to war.  The logic here suggests that if “non-state entities can provide this same 
possibility for meaningful political community, then such entities may also at times have the 
right to wage war…”79  Brian Orend takes this a step further.  He argues that war should be 
understood not as a conflict between sovereign states, but instead as conflict between 
political communities.80  This seems to make room in the just war tradition for wars fought 
by and between NSAs.  This is, however, a very slippery slope argument.  If such a loose 
standard is used to judge the authority of actors to engage in the use of force, there is really 
no end in sight.  Adopting this standard of legitimate authority, we would have to include 
substate revolutionary groups, armed criminal organizations, terrorist groups, etc.  As long as 
an NSA used organized violence to affect a political order, they could seemingly meet the 
standard.  The incorporation of NSAs is something that contemporary just war scholars have 
thought the tradition incapable of addressing.81  In order to strengthen the tradition, the 
argument is to adopt new standards of justice to account for the changing nature of warfare.  
Introducing NSAs into the just war tradition will have the opposite effect.  With the inclusion 
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of a whole host of previously illegitimate actors, the tradition will lose its moral efficacy and 
practicality for policy-makers.  This threat aside, allowing the tradition to include NSAs is a 
betrayal of the tradition as it developed in order to promote certain important principles, 
namely the just use of force to protect order, stability, and security.  Trouble is, most terrorist 
organizations seek to overturn the existing political order, at odds with the fundamentals of 
the just war tradition.  Even if an NSA does not seek to change the existing political order, 
they do not play by the rules of BOP or respond in kind to threats of MAD.  While NSAs 
increasingly demonstrate state-like military capabilities, they do not behave like states as 
regards threats to international security. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE JUST WAR TRADITION:  
CLASSICAL UNDERSTANDINGS 
The widely accepted criteria of the just war tradition listed above is the result of more 
than 2000 years of conversation about ethics in war.  To understand the classic just war 
tradition in this way is essentially correct.  However, it is wrong to find the tradition in this 
highly complete form in the writings of any specific just war theorist in the development of 
the tradition.  Neither Augustine nor Thomas Aquinas, two of the most recognizable theorists 
of just war, conceived the tradition in this highly advanced form.  Likewise, it is also not 
correct to assume that the tradition is a wholly Christian doctrine, i.e., theological or 
canonical.  The just war tradition is rightly understood as an amalgam of many different 
theories on the just conduct of war, secular, moral, divine and philosophical.  Indeed, the just 
war tradition in its fullest form “was the result of forces from outside as well as within the 
walls of the medieval church.”1  As such, the classic just war tradition was a product of 
secular and divine sources together which has helped contribute to both its strength and 
practicality.  By including elements of numerous theories on the ethics of war, the just war 
tradition has developed into the most comprehensive consideration on the subject.  This, in 
turn, helps promote its universality even though just war theory is largely a product of 
western sources: Greco-Romans first and then Catholic canonists.2   
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Greco-Roman Just War Theory 
James Turner Johnson, the premier just war historian, has observed that in its origins, 
just war theory is essentially a synthesis of Greco-Roman and Christian values.3  The ancient 
Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) is widely credited with coining the term just war.4  
In stark contrast to the older idea of holy war, thought to be mandated by Divinity, Aristotle’s 
just war was strictly secular in nature.  Yet, a just war so developed by Aristotle was not 
purely an altruistic conception.  His most important contribution to the just war tradition was 
the principle of self defense.  Aristotle “thought it morally justified to go to war to prevent 
one’s community from being attacked and enslaved by another.”5  There is, today, agreement 
among just war theorists that self-defense is the most appropriate just cause for war.  
However, Aristotle did articulate two controversial principles of just war, neither of which 
has survived.  First, Aristotle justified going to war to gain an empire.  He also argued that 
war to gain slaves for one’s community could be justified.6  With regard to individual vs. 
state conceptions of justice and the procurement of such, Aristotle was clear: “when devoid 
of virtue man is the most unscrupulous and savage of animals…”  Therefore, justice “is an 
element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the 
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regulation of the political leadership.”7  This seems to be the earliest form of a legitimate 
authority.  What is implied here is that there is something inherent in the state not found in 
individuals.   
The “state” as understood by Aristotle was the city-state of Athens.  Much like other 
Greek city-states at the time, Athens had a predominately agricultural economy.  In order to 
sustain this type of economy, the work force in Athens was largely drawn from slaves 
captured in war or bought from pirates.8  This is precisely why Aristotle found it just to wage 
war for the attainment of slaves.  The political make-up of Athens at the time was 
characterized by severely limited enfranchisement.  This right was limited to sons of 
enfranchised men and political participation was completely closed to women.9  I point this 
out in order to show that at the time of the earliest formulation of a just war theory, the state 
did not gain its legitimacy due to its representative nature or its defense of human rights.  
Ancient Athens was, by our standards, a crude form of democracy.  Yet, Aristotle still 
contributed the authority to wage war to the state for the purpose of security. 
The Roman Empire followed the Greek Empire.  As a result of Rome’s battlefield 
success, the senator Cicero (106-43 BC) developed deep reflections on war.  In fact, Brian 
Orend claims that Cicero “probably deserves credit for co-founding just war theory with 
Augustine…”10  Cicero legitimized wars of self-defense and much like Aristotle, endorsed 
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wars waged in the defense of Rome’s honor or glory: “a war is never undertaken by the ideal 
state, except in defense of its honour or its safety…”11  Continuing a theme found in Aristotle 
above, Cicero pointed out the importance of the continuation of the state: “death is not 
natural for a state as it is for a human being…there is some great similarity…between the 
overthrow, destruction, and extinction of a state, and the decay and dissolution of the whole 
universe.”12  It is clear in this passage that Cicero attributes an intrinsic value to the state.  
One of the important duties of the state is the procurement of the just use of force.  
Undertaking a just war in defense of the state, whether for safety or honor is an important 
part of its continuation, the extinction of which would invite chaos and dissolution.13  It is up 
to the state, as the arbiter of justice, to use force judiciously.   
Unlike Aristotle, Cicero did reject the employment of war to acquire slave labor.14  
Most importantly, Cicero added to Aristotle’s just cause requirement the principles of proper 
authority and public declaration.15  Cicero “demanded the articulation of a formal declaration 
of war by the king or emperor.”16  Rome’s political procedures as to the decision to wage war 
reflected an early commitment to the [now] prudential criteria of last resort.  The military 
could not engage in war until a quasi-diplomatic exchange between Rome and a potential 
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adversary had clearly signaled the latter’s intent to engage Rome militarily.17  The chain of 
events in this diplomatic exchange is important for the principle of legitimate authority.  
Rome’s diplomatic party would be sent to the target city of a potential adversary and 
announce Rome’s discrepancy and lay out the framework of rectification.  If no satisfactory 
response was given by the rival empire, Rome’s diplomatic party would then return to the 
enemy and threaten war.18  When an immediate and positive reply was not given, the party 
would return to Rome and inform the Senate.  If the Senate voted for war, the party would 
again travel to the enemy and officially declare war.19  The important aspect of this procedure 
is that the diplomatic party had to inform the Senate, the official representative body of the 
state.  Since it took a vote of the Senate to declare war, this body thus represented the 
legitimate authority for the decision to use force.20 Cicero also developed early principles of 
jus in bello, commenting “repeatedly on the need for restraint in battle.”21   
What we see in the writings of both Aristotle and Cicero is the development and 
application of a just war theory for thinking about and responding to the real-world dilemmas 
of politics.  Also inherent here is an early development of the principle of legitimate 
authority.  Even in antiquity, the state was considered the legitimate authority with the 
responsibility to engage in the use of force.  Considering Cicero’s high regard for the state as 
an essential piece in the ordering of the universe, it is not surprising that it was the Senate 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 11.  
 
18
 Orend, The Morality of War, 11.  
 
19
 Ibid., 11.  
 
20
 Ibid., 11.  
 
21
 Ibid., 11.  
42 
 
which held the responsibility of deciding war.  Aristotle likewise argued that the procurement 
of justice was the business of the state, not of the individual.  Through the political 
procedure, rather than the unscrupulous behavior of individual men, justice could be decided 
and security preserved. 
The Early Christian Synthesis 
The Roman emperor Constantine (306-337) is widely assumed to have presided over 
a revolution in early Christian thinking about war and military service more generally.22  The 
standard account of this transformation goes something like this: Jesus was a pacifist who 
accepted neither the use of violent means to advance his message nor the resort to violence in 
self-defense.  Following the example of Christ, the early Church was pacifistic in both 
regards.  Pacifism remained a central tenet of Christian thought until early in the fourth 
century when the arrival of Constantine affected a change in Christian thought.  According to 
this account, what Constantine did was bring “the Church and its leaders into such close 
proximity to the state that the Church lost its earlier purity and became accommodated to the 
needs of the secular empire.”23  What Constantine did was lay the foundation for Christianity 
to become the official, state-sanctioned religion of the Roman Empire.  However, what 
Constantine did not do was preside over or usher in a grand revolutionary change in early 
Christian thought on the subject.  There is evidence to the contrary, in fact.  Throughout the 
Old and New Testaments in the Bible, there are accounts of Christians serving in the Roman 
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Army before Constantine.24  Further, leading Christian theorists in the centuries before the 
arrival of Constantine as emperor debated and began to articulate a Christian theory on the 
ethics of war, not all of which recited the assumed pacifistic doctrine.25 
Clement of Alexandria (150-215) is perhaps the first Christian just war thinker.  
While Clement did not specifically use the term “just war”, his contribution to the 
development of the tradition is notable.  Clement’s writings attempted to achieve a synthesis 
of Roman Army principles and Christian thought to produce an early form of a just war 
theory.  Augustine is widely credited with having done this, but Augustine actually drew 
upon the writings of Clement to advance his theory of a just war.26  Contrary to the widely 
held notion of a pacifistic Christian doctrine prior to Constantine, Clement argued that 
military service and war were “justified to protect the goods represented by the Empire.”27  In 
general, Clement’s writings advanced the theory of how and when the resort to military force 
might be justified.  Specifically, Clement noted two of the three jus ad bellum criteria 
advanced by Augustine: just cause (protection of the goods represented by the empire) and 
legitimate authority (possessed by the emperor).28 
It is important to recognize that one will not find a fully articulated just war theory in 
the writings of Clement, or even Augustine for that matter.  This was formulated much later 
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in the writings of Aquinas and others.  What is to be taken from the writings of Clement is 
the advancement of a Christian theory of just war which was not pacifistic in nature and one 
which was developed before Constantine established Christianity as the official religion of 
the Roman Empire.  The question that consumed him and prompted him to comment on the 
ethics of war was: what is the role of the Christian in the affairs of the Roman Empire?  In 
articulating an answer to this question, Clement did not find that Christians had to fully 
separate themselves from the affairs of the secular world to remain true to Christianity.  
Rather, engagement with the affairs of the state could in fact help advance the goods found in 
the state.  Clement used the two principles of just cause and legitimate authority to comment 
broadly on the responsibility of the Empire as the prevailing governmental authority of the 
time.  He also argued for the idea of responsibility and attributed that notion to the state.  The 
over-arching theme was that “Christians might responsibly take part in securing the temporal 
goods represented by the state…”29  In this regard, Clement attributed legitimate authority to 
the emperor.  The implications of this were not drawn out as fully as they were by Augustine, 
but the assumption remains: the emperor was the legitimate authority of a state which 
represented the advancement of certain temporal goods, namely security and order.  The state 
was viewed as charged with the task of protecting the people “from the onslaught of the 
barbarians from outside.”30  Christians were justified in taking up arms in the defense of the 
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state to protect the goods represented by the Empire.31  In sum, Clement deferred to the 
authority of the state to wage a just war. 
Following Clement, another Christian formulation was put forth by Ambrose, Bishop 
of Milan (340-397).  Writing after Constantine had laid the foundation for the establishment 
of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire, Ambrose viewed the Empire’s 
responsibility in the same vein as Clement.  With Clement, Ambrose shared the view that the 
purpose of the Empire was to protect the people from outside invasion and to provide order 
and security.  Yet, since Christianity had been elevated to a state religion, Ambrose 
considered outside threats as intent upon the destruction of not only the Empire but also 
Christendom.  This outlook necessitated a Christian re-examination of the ethics of war.  As 
a result, Ambrose continued what Clement had begun and “merged Christian ethics with the 
Ciceronian tradition of public and private duties…”32  These duties included self-
preservation, “defense of others and intervention, finding justice in war that preserves the 
country from the barbarians…or defends one’s neighbors from robbers.”33  Ambrose echoed 
Clement’s writing, arguing that military force may be necessary to protect the goods 
represented by society.  As I mentioned above, Ambrose viewed the Empire as a protector of 
Christianity namely, but also of order and security.  In order to preserve these goods, war 
may be necessary.  Here again we see a deference to the state as a necessary element in the 
achievement of order and security.  It is because of this that the state may be justified in 
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using armed force.  With regard specifically to legitimate authority, Ambrose advanced the 
position that it was the duty of the laity, as opposed to the Clergy, to make war.  As a former 
commentator on secular policy in the Roman Empire and the holder of a high civil office, 
Ambrose questioned the degree to which the Church ought to be involved in making war.  
For Ambrose, that duty was left to the state.34   
While Ambrose’s specific thought on just war does not differ much from that of 
Clement, his greatest contribution to the just war tradition is that “he achieved a practical 
synthesis of Christian and secular thought…”35  What this synthesis achieved is two-fold.  
First and most importantly, this blend laid the framework for Augustine and Aquinas’s just 
war theory.  Specifically, Ambrose’s argument that Christians ought to be peaceful in 
warring is retrenched later in the writings of Augustine and Aquinas.  Second, it blends “a 
limited acceptance of Christian participation in the use of force together with established 
secular Roman traditions on the legitimation of war.”36  In the end, what this amounts to is a 
de facto obligation for Christians, yet not the Church, to use force in the defense of the goods 
represented by the state.37   
Augustine 
Considering the historical development of the tradition laid out above, it is almost 
impossible to argue that Augustine was the sole founder of just war theory.  In fact, 
                                                 
34
 Johnson, The Quest for Peace, 57.   
 
35
 Ibid., 57.  
  
36
 Ibid., 56.  
 
37
 Ibid., 56.  
 
47 
 
Augustine’s writings build upon the foundation laid by Greco-Roman and early Christian 
writers.  Augustine (354-430) was a great admirer of Cicero whom he thought to represent 
“the very best of all that is Roman.”38  Ambrose is similarly exalted in the writings of 
Augustine.  John Mattox, an expert on Augustinian thought remarks that “Ambrose is to 
Augustine…as Socrates is to Plato.”39  The influence of both of these writers upon Augustine 
is apparent.  Cicero’s reverence for the state is found in Augustine’s writings.  Further, 
Ambrose’s attempt to synthesize Roman political practice with Christian thinking is 
mentioned and extended in many of Augustine’s works.  What sets Augustine apart however 
is that in Augustine we see the beginning framework of what will eventually be a more 
complete just war theory.  To be sure, the just war tradition as we know it today is 
conceptualized much later.  Yet, Augustine is the first just war theorist to fully draw out the 
connection between the legitimate authority and the responsibilities associated with the right 
to engage in the use of force, namely order and security. 
While Augustine and Cicero agree that the preservation of the state is the most 
desirable aim, the world in which they lived was very different.  The circumstances 
surrounding Augustine’s world shaped his just war theory in an altogether different manner 
than that of Cicero.  Augustine lived in the day of the decline of the Roman Empire and its 
approaching collapse.  The Empire was being threatened externally as well as internally.  
Barbaric peoples from northern Europe and central Asia were the primary external threat 
while civil war within the provinces of the Empire itself posed a challenge to internal 
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stability.  As such, war was never far from being a reality and the dissolution of the state, 
unthinkable in Cicero’s time, was a glaring reality.40  With regard to the external threats to 
the empire, Augustine was primarily concerned by the violence and lawlessness which 
characterized the various tribes and barbarian factions threatening to overwhelm the empire.  
To me, this has very relevant connotations to the nature of twenty-first century international 
relations.  States are in the position of providing the goods of international security and order.  
This security and order are being challenged by the unrelenting violence of NSAs as they 
seek to overthrow existing political orders both domestically and internationally.  
In his massive fourth century masterpiece, The City of God, Augustine presents his 
argument for the purpose of the state.  Reflecting the Christian nature of Ambrose’s just war 
theory, Augustine juxtaposes the temporal nature of the state with the eternal Kingdom of 
God.  He conceptualizes the universe as God’s realm: “God is the ultimate Creator, Judge, 
Arbiter, and End.”41  Within God’s universe, the tragic reality of sin permeates human 
relationships.  Nonetheless, God sustains the universe with a divine order.  By the time of 
Augustine’s writings, the Roman Empire had adopted Christianity as the official religion of 
the state.  With this in mind, it is important to note that while Augustine recognized this, he 
ultimately concluded that “the city of Rome and the Kingdom of God could not possibly be 
one and the same.”42  The divine order with which God sustains the universe can never be 
reflected fully in the state.  Yet, the state with its laws and hierarchy does, more than any 
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other, mirror this divine order.  Temporal political order, while being a poor reflection of the 
City of God, most approximates that eternal order.43  Augustine consistently praised political 
order over disorder.  Because the threat of political disorder was such a tragic reality, 
Augustine genuinely feared the breakdown of civic order.  Specifically, Augustine termed 
this tranquillitas ordinis.  At a minimum, the primary responsibility of government is to 
provide basic security and order.  The earthy dominion of government “has been established 
to serve God and to benefit all human beings.”44  As such, it is the authority of earthly kings 
and kingdoms to use force and that matters of temporal order should not be left to self help.45  
The prospect of leaving questions of justice and order in the hands of individuals conjures up 
a nightmare of private warfare, rife with vengeance and vendettas, motives for war which 
Augustine specifically rejects.46  Those in positions of authority have the responsibility and 
obligation to protect the temporal goods of domestic and international life. Augustine’s 
conception of order and responsibility stipulates that the goods of the tranquillitas ordinis 
cannot be achieved in the face of pervasive and unrelenting violence, which is the basic 
nature of private warfare.47 
It is within this context that Augustine’s conception of legitimate authority is set.  In a 
letter to Count Boniface, a Roman official with responsibility for public order in his region 
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“and the command of troops to maintain that order…” Augustine outlines the purpose for 
waging war: “We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have 
peace.”48  It is particularly instructive that Augustine instructs Count Boniface how to 
prosecute war, noting Boniface’s responsibility for public order.  Perhaps Augustine’s most 
succinct statement on the principle of legitimate authority is found in this passage in the 
Contra Faustum.  Augustine’s line of reasoning is that only a public authority can justly use 
military force: “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power 
to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme 
authority.”49  The Latin word used by Augustine to define war is bellum.  This word literally 
translates “war” which at the time was a conflict between two prevailing governmental, 
public authorities.50  In contrast another Latin word duellum which translates “a duel”.  A 
duel is a conflict between private authorities for reasons not associated with the duties of the 
state.  Therefore, Augustine’s thought on legitimate authority is that bellum, when 
undertaken by the proper authority may or may not be just depending on the circumstances; 
duellum, on the other hand, can never be.51 
Augustine holds unmistakably that human governments are ordained by God for the 
benefit of man.  The political sovereign is God’s lieutenant on earth.  Decisions by the 
authority to wage war are reflections of the divine will.  Indeed, the legitimate right to wage 
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war is vested exclusively in the sovereign authority: “the natural order which seeks peace for 
mankind ordains that the monarch should have the power for undertaking war.”52  Augustine 
also argues that the power to wage war is one of the functions which properly belongs to a 
“just government.”53  Interestingly, Augustine argues that temporal legal authority to wage 
war is found not in the degree of the sovereign’s personal righteousness, but in the position 
itself.  As God’s arbiter for temporal political order, the sovereign authority has the 
legitimate authority to wage war.  The overarching argument from Augustine with regard to 
legitimate authority is that “the state has a responsibility to both domestic and international 
security-a responsibility that it must uphold, even if the state dirties its hands in the process 
of securing the realm.”54   
Clearly, the contemporary applications of the just war tradition outlined above are far 
more restrictive than the minimalistic conception formulated by the early secular and 
Christian writers.  Indeed, much of the just war literature today lacks their practical concern 
for “political order in the form of national security [and] responsibility for standing up to 
aggression.”55 
In addition to developing the principle of legitimate authority, Augustine introduced 
the principle of right intention.  What is significant about this principle is that Augustine 
conceptualized it within the jus ad bellum, which was the primary theory on just war, but also 
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attributed right intention to jus in bello, still in its infancy.  The jus ad bellum understanding 
of right intention is essentially that a ruler must order war with the greatest reluctance and not 
for the motives of territorial aggrandizement or revenge.  War is to be waged with the 
ultimate goal of peace in mind.  Right intention in the jus in bello was understood to mean 
that soldiers executing the command of the ruler must also “get no joy out of bloodlust and 
violence but, rather, should protect the innocents and fend off the guilty attackers with 
nothing but solemn duty as their focus.”56  Although Augustine’s jus in bello and general just 
war theory was rudimentary by our standards, his writings began to shape the direction that 
just war thought would take for centuries to follow. 
Thomas Aquinas 
From the time of Augustine to the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the just war 
tradition, jus ad bellum in particular, was perverted by regression of the European political 
scene.  This time period 500-1000, is commonly referred to as the Dark Ages due to the lack 
of information which has survived from this time period.  The western part of the Roman 
Empire dissolved into a number of small ethnic groups and many wars between them ensued.  
Around 800, “attempts were made by ambitious local warlords to consolidate their control 
over larger pieces of territory.”57  The Catholic Church was the only institution to survive the 
collapse of Roman civilization.  As a result of its incredible longevity, these local warlords 
sought to win the Church’s approval as it could essentially give them the stamp of 
legitimacy.   
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Between 1000-1300, these European warlords answered the Church’s call for a series 
of military crusades against the encroachment of Islam into Europe.58  During this period, the 
concept of holy war was once again resurrected and, for a time, war was approved based on 
the direct blessing of God found in sacred scripture or specific religious authorities such as 
the pope.  The difference between holy war and just war is that just war is not sacred in 
nature; it is merely moral.  During the Dark Ages, just war and holy war became 
inappropriately conflated by Christian writers and theorists.  Jus ad bellum was polluted with 
religious dimensions like “self-righteousness, inflexibility, demonization of others and 
fanaticism.”59  Thankfully, today, no just war theorist endorses holy war as a just cause for 
war.  With regard to jus in bello, however, important steps were taken during the latter part of 
the Dark Ages and into the crusades.  Specifically, the writings of Gratian in 1148 helped to 
form concrete principles in the jus in bello.60 
Within the context of warring ethnic and religious groups led by numerous warlords, 
Thomas Aquinas contributed a just war theory spear-headed by the principle of legitimate 
authority.  In addition to warring ethnic and religious factions, there were “very wealthy 
trading enterprises, with their own private militias or armed security corps…also sporting 
private militias were aristocrats out to challenge the king…”61  His conception of this 
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principle marks both a return to the original nature of legitimate authority as well as 
providing commentary for a practical way to approach temporal politics.   
Aquinas’s commentary on just war is found in the Summa Theologica.  In this 
writing, Aquinas seeks to answer various questions on the topic of war.  One of the questions 
that he answers is: whether war is sinful.  “In order for a war to be just, three things are 
necessary.”  He lists these three conditions, which he borrows from Augustine, as: sovereign 
authority, just cause, and right intention.62  What is most striking about Aquinas’s list is not 
only the privileged position he gives to the authority principle, but the way in which he 
defines just cause and right intention with regard to the principle of sovereign authority.  His 
definition of these two principles is focused on “the preservation of evil, the setting right of 
wrongs already done, the punishment of evildoers, and the overall promotion of good.”63  
According to James Turner Johnson, there is an undeniable significance here.  It is important 
that Aquinas’s list of the requirements for just war begins with sovereign authority, “and so 
that we do not miss the significance of this requirement…he reminds us by the way he casts 
the requirements of just cause and right intention.  These are all precisely what the good ruler 
is to do.”64  Also implicit in his ordering of just war principles is “the assumption that war is 
by definition an act of state, proclaimed and executed by those who speak and act on the 
state’s behalf.65 
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Aquinas’s definition of sovereign authority is thus: 
“For it is not the business of the private individual to declare war, 
because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his 
superior.  Moreover, it is not the business of a private individual to 
summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime.  And 
as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in 
authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the 
city, kingdom or province subject to them.  And just as it is lawful 
for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common 
weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, so 
too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in 
defending the common weal against external enemies.”66 
For our purposes, two things stand out here.  First, Aquinas specifically makes a 
distinction between “the rights of the sovereign and those of private persons relating to 
war.”67  This is all the more important considering the international political situation at the 
time of this writing.  Second, the right of the sovereign to wage war is derived from “the 
positive responsibilities as the one given charge for the common weal.”68  These positive 
responsibilities include those listed above: prevention of evil, promotion of good, punishment 
of evil.  Inherent in a legitimate authority as understood by Aquinas is first and foremost that 
the legitimate authority be a sovereign, public authority and not a private person.  From the 
position of a legitimate authority as such, the right to wage war is derived.  This reflects 
Augustine’s argument that it is the position as such that holds the right, not the individual.   
 Aquinas prioritized legitimate authority for a reason.  He wanted us to “look behind 
that requirement to its foundation in the conception of the good political community and the 
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responsibility of the sovereign authority to support its common weal and defend it against 
threats from both within and without.”69  Therefore, “the legitimate use of force should only 
be in the hands of the rightful authorities in order to promote security.”70 
In Aquinas we see the intersection of morality and pragmatism in legitimate 
authority.  The concept of morality is found in the sovereign authority’s responsibility to 
protect the common weal.  Using the basis of morality, Aquinas condemned the private 
militias and armed trading companies challenging the rule of the king.  Pragmatically, he 
gave us a standard by which to evaluate the present international situation in a way that 
preserves the principles of security and order provided by the state.  For Aquinas, the purpose 
of the state was to provide a counter to the lawlessness found in private militias seeking to 
usurp power.  It is striking to see the similarities between the proliferation of private militias 
in Aquinas’s time and the growth of NSAs in our time.  Aquinas favored the non-
proliferation of armies.  The general thought of Aquinas was that “the more armies we have 
got, the more likely they’ll step on each other’s toes and start fighting.”71  His rejection of the 
proliferation of private armies led him to favor a more central authority like a king or prince.  
In this sense, “Aquinas sided with the rise of the modern nation-state.”72 
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Grotius And The Development of International Law 
Following Aquinas, the coalescence of the just war tradition around the core jus ad 
bellum principles intersected with the rise of the modern nation-state and the early 
development of international law.  This combination has had a profound effect on the way 
the just war tradition developed in the early- modern period and how it is understood today.   
Essentially, we can see a shift in the international political system between the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815.  The development of 
international law, led by the writings of Hugo Grotius, fostered a divorce between the 
heretofore union of morality and pragmatism in the just war tradition.  A more legalistically 
structured international system grew out of the centuries-long wars of religion when holy 
war, rather than just war, provided the justification for a resort to force.  Nevertheless, 
distinct and transformative ideas began to dominate the international political system during 
this time period.73 
For our purposes, the idea of sovereignty was fundamentally reconceived, beginning 
with the writings of Grotius as early as 1625. Traditionally, sovereignty or the sovereign 
authority represented the political authority with no superior.  Throughout the development 
of the just war tradition, this has been attributed to many different entities: the Senate of 
ancient Greek city-states, the ruler of the Roman Empire, the King, Prince, or other ruler of 
the independent kingdoms formed after the fall of the Roman Empire.  Vested in each of 
these authorities was the right to engage in the use of force.  This right was understood to be 
the exclusive realm of the sovereign authority as such.  However, not only was this right 
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given to the sovereign as such, the framers of the just war tradition, both secular and divine, 
understood that the sword was to be wielded by the authority with certain moral principles in 
mind: defense of the state, protection of the goods of society; essentially security and order.  
Included within the legalistic understanding of the sovereign as the highest political entity 
were the morally-based goods of security and order.  This combination characterizes 
legitimate authority traditionally understood.   
Authority was thus associated with the person, or ruler, or the position itself.  
Associating legitimate authority with the ruler of the empire or state is an embodiment of the 
ruler with the legitimate authority to make war.  This association is, as Augustine pointed 
out, not to be a continuation of the righteousness of the person himself.  Rather, the 
legitimate authority to make war was vested in the person as the embodiment of the position 
of sovereign with the responsibility to defend order and provide security.   
The shift that took place in this time period was to disassociate authority with the 
person or ruler and to place it in the entity itself, namely the state.  Essentially, it was a “shift 
in the idea of sovereignty from the individual who wields it to the state on whose behalf it is 
wielded.”74   
In 1625, Hugo Grotius published De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and 
Peace).  This work became the foundation upon which modern international law developed.  
Like many just war theorists before him, Grotius rethought the inherited just war tradition.  
His rethinking transformed the tradition into a theory of the law of nations.  On the matter of 
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authority to make war, Grotius continued the requirement that it be a sovereign authority.75  
Yet, as I mentioned, he “located the basis of sovereignty in the political entity governed, not 
in the person or persons who govern.”76  “The subject of sovereignty is the state”, he 
declares, “and not any particular person.”77  Grotius does rightly distinguish the private 
interests of the ruler from the interests of the state for which he is responsible.  This is in line 
with the writings of both Augustine and Aquinas.  Yet, he then goes on to argue that 
sovereign power derives from the people of the state, an interpretation of natural law which 
will heavily influence the just war tradition for centuries to come.78  Indeed, writers like John 
Locke picked up on the theme of natural law arguing that the rights of man were based in 
nature, contrasting the centuries-old understanding that these rights were given by the state.  
It is from this line of reasoning that cosmopolitanism and a rights-based just war theory have 
developed.  Using a natural law understanding of the state and the rights of man has led many 
to argue that if a particular NSA can meet this standard, essentially that the organization 
claim representative status and be perceived to enjoy that status by the people it claims to 
represent, then it qualifies as a legitimate authority to wage war.79 
One of the biggest consequences of this new conception of sovereignty and authority 
“was that the exercise of sovereign power in regard to the use of armed force became more 
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formalistic and less moral in character.”80  Grotius’s natural law construct “disconnected 
morality from any single political authority structure.”81 Influenced heavily by the religiously 
motivated wars which had torn Europe apart for centuries, Grotius sought to recast the 
justification for the use of armed force in terms of legality rather than morality.  The over-
arching theme of Grotius’s thought was the idea that the right to make war was given to 
states by the law of nature, as opposed to a mandate from divinity.  With regard to just cause, 
Grotius narrowed the cause of justice to the purpose of self-defense.  His mandate that war 
must be formally declared by the sovereign authority on behalf of the state sought to make 
“the initiation of armed hostilities more subject to objective judgments…”82  The problem is 
that Grotius completely discounted conceptions of morality and justice as they relate to the 
right to make war.  Preservation of order and the pursuit of security are both moral principles 
expressly articulated by the traditional just war theorists outlined above.  While traditional 
just war theory envisioned the state, “under the authority of its sovereign head, as the central 
actor in the employment of armed force to combat injustice…” the result of Grotian 
conceptions of sovereignty and authority has been the development of legal thought in the 
just war tradition which has “sought to limit the right of individual states to resort to force.”83  
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This has had the effect of “making war seem more an instrument of injustice than of justice, 
more a source of destruction of lives and values than a means of protecting them.”84   
This indictment of the state-centered international system, based in part on the horrors 
of total war in the twentieth century, has led many to question the positive role the state can 
and should play in the preservation of order and the pursuit of security in the twenty-first 
century.  Indeed, the framework of the sovereign state-system is under increasing challenge 
in the twenty-first century.  Both local and global demands upon this framework threaten to 
destabilize the international political order.  Locally, “new wars” are beginning to 
demonstrate “that those using military force range from states to revolutionary movements to 
ethnic groups.”85  Private military contractors have begun to redefine the rules of warfare and 
challenge the conception that states authorities control the use of force.  Terrorist 
organizations and guerilla movements motivated by ideology and a lust to destroy the 
existing political order challenge the very fundamentals of the international political system.  
These are serious threats.  States in the international community need to carefully consider 
how to deal with these threats.  As a framework providing commentary on the moral and 
pragmatic use of force, the just war tradition must provide states with a way forward.  
 This chapter has been an attempt to argue that as public authorities, states, rather than 
private, NSAs, have the moral responsibility to provide security and order to the international 
political system.  The central role of states as guarantors of these principles is being 
threatened by the proliferation of NSAs engaging in state-like military capabilities.  Yet, 
NSAs do not have the same goals of states in the international system.  They are not 
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motivated by security or survival.  Nor do they play by the rules of BOP.  As such, they 
cannot be accepted into the just war tradition as legitimate authorities.  The writings of 
traditional scholars of just war theory show that states, or the legitimate authority of the time, 
sit at the intersection of morality and practicality.  To strip the just war tradition of this dual-
themed history in order to fit NSAs into the tradition is a betrayal of just war’s founding 
principles.  In order that just war remain an eminently practical framework for the ethical use 
of force, its over-arching principles and themes must be retained in any discussion about the 
morality of war in the twenty-first century.  This efficacy is rooted in the fact that the ethical 
dilemmas of public v. private authorities and the use of force have been explored by just 
war’s founding theorists.  A look back provides us with the necessary framework to move 
forward.  In order to move forward, we must re-centralize the role of the state as the central 
player in the international political system.  Threats to the state’s centrality and responsibility 
must be recognized and dealt with according to the principles of the just war tradition.  The 
next chapter will examine the role of NSAs in the twenty-first century, and comment on their 
inapplicability to the just war tradition’s concept of legitimate authority.
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CHAPTER 4 
NSAS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Private Military Contractors  
As of July 2010, the United States employed more private military contractors 
(PMCs) than uniformed personnel in the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.1  
PMCs do serve important tactical and strategic roles in each of these campaigns.  The nature 
of twenty-first century warfare and specifically the problems presented by the war on terror 
has given rise to the role that PMCs continue to play.  With the attacks on September 11, 
2001, the global war on terror began in full force and would provide the type of war that 
PMCs were well equipped to fight.  With an evolving war that would not center on the 
clashing of massive armies on large battlefields, but rather quick response teams to take out 
embedded terrorists, the stage was primed for the rise of PMCs.   
To be sure, the Department of Defense has long relied upon contractors to support 
military operations.2  During the Revolutionary War, “the Continental Army relied on 
contractors to provide such goods and services as transportation and engineering services, 
clothing, and weapons.”3  Also, Hessian mercenaries were employed by England in the 
American Revolution.  Since then, major advances in technology and the nature of warfare 
have expanded the role and responsibilities of contractors in military operations.4  Currently, 
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PMCs provide services for which the U.S. government is bureaucratically too cumbersome.  
These companies serve the government from the private sector in a force enhancing manner.  
They create and staff the food supply lines so that the U.S. Army no longer has to provide 
that service internally.  In many ways, this has proved to be a more efficient means of waging 
war; freeing up portions of the Army that were dedicated to logistical support and refocusing 
on actually waging the war.  Indeed, as of March 2010, 65% of contractor personnel in Iraq 
were engaged in a base support role.  Base support functions include maintaining the 
grounds, running dining facilities and providing laundry services.5 The other 35% is made up 
of functions including security, training, logistics, construction and transportation.6  While 
the percentage of base support operations has remained relatively constant throughout the 
duration of the Iraqi operation, the role that PMCs provide for security has increased.7  
Evidence suggests that some states are beginning to cede direct “control over important 
security operations to the private sector.”8  The very nature of these actors is perhaps their 
greatest danger.  By reducing the political and material costs of waging war, they make “the 
resort to force in general easier to contemplate.”9  Indeed, PMCs are increasingly present in 
“international conflict situations where states find it easier to outsource some security 
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operations.”10  The ambiguous nature of security operations remains the most troubling 
aspect of PMCs’ role in the war on terror and for considerations of legitimate authority.  As I 
proceed to examine the role of PMC operations in the war on terror, it helps to keep in mind 
Augustine’s formulation of the role of a legitimate authority: “the natural order conducive to 
human peace demands that the power to counsel and declare war belongs to those who hold 
the supreme authority.”11 
Many of the problems, specifically in Iraq, can be traced back to the infamous 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17.  This 16 page document outlines a 
number of definitions of various organizational plans for the administration of post-invasion 
Iraq.  Inside this document is found the clause that allows the contractors to essentially get 
out of jail free: “Unless provided otherwise herein, the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison 
Missions, their personnel, property, funds and assets, and all International Consultants shall 
be immune from the Iraqi legal process.”12  In essence, this clause creates a loophole for 
PMCs in Iraq and prevents any accountability to the Iraqi government specifically, and the 
rule of law in general.  This will come to be of utmost importance in a number of cases 
involving Blackwater, a controversial PMC in Iraq.13  Not only did this law give PMC 
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operatives freedom from prosecution, but it stripped them of any considerations for their 
actions when dealing with civilians.  
There are a number of examples which illustrate that Blackwater was operating 
essentially outside of the command and control of the U.S. military and with impunity for 
their actions especially with regard to security operations.  On April 4, 2004, the CPA 
headquarters in Najaf came under attack by 300 to 400 insurgents.14  Ultimately, the building 
was defended by eight guards from Blackwater and a handful of Marines.  However, before 
U.S. reinforcements could arrive, “the firm…sent in its own helicopters amid an intense 
firefight to resupply its commandos with ammunition and to ferry out a wounded Marine.”15  
Although the personnel acted bravely to hold their position, Blackwater was unwilling to 
comment on the incident and provide its view of the events.  Even more troubling for 
considerations of legitimate authority is a statement from a DoD spokesman that “there were 
no military reports about the opening hours of the siege on CPA headquarters in Najaf 
because there were no military personnel on the scene.”16  As a result the DoD “does not 
have a clear handle on the daily actions of security contractors because the contractors work 
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directly for the coalition authority, which coordinates and communicates on a limited basis 
through the normal military chain of command.”17   
In another stunning example of Blackwater’s operational impunity, we turn to the 
events of 7 February, 2006.  On this particular day, a sniper employed by Blackwater, 
“opened fire from the roof of the Iraqi Justice Ministry.  The 
bullet tore through the head of a 23-year-old guard for the 
state-funded Iraqi Media Network, who was standing on a 
balcony across an open traffic circle.  Another guard rushed to 
his colleague’s side and was fatally shot in the neck.  A third 
guard was found dead more than an hour later on the same 
balcony.”18 
The only certainty this case offers is that three guards were killed and Blackwater 
personnel did open fire.  However, there is a large lack of evidence in this case to draw solid 
conclusions.  The Iraqi Police and the State Department have both written conflicting 
accounts of the incident.  The Blackwater agents were guarding a U.S. diplomat holding a 
meeting inside the Justice Ministry building, which was the purpose for snipers posted atop 
the building.  Incidentally, this gave snipers the perfect angle to fire at the Iraqi Media 
Network building across the square.  The official Iraqi police report reached the conclusion 
that the guards had not opened fire on the Justice Ministry nor the Blackwater personnel.   
Blackwater personnel claimed that they were fired upon and returned fire appropriate 
to the circumstances they believed they found themselves in.  Aside from declaring that the 
guards came under fire, “the company was unable to comment further because of operational 
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security and contractual obligations.”19  None of the reports can pinpoint if the Blackwater 
guards came under fire first, if Blackwater fired first, or if a third unnamed party did 
something to provoke the incident.  Once again, Blackwater was protected not only by its 
silence, but by operational immunity guaranteed to contractors in Iraq. 
There are strong implications about how warfare will be conducted in the future with 
regards to private military contractors.  If the U.S. is able to create a stable and legal 
operational frame of laws and rules through which the contractors can operate, there is a 
chance for an exciting, albeit risky, opportunity for the private sector to gain lucrative 
contracts and directly aid in the country’s strategic goals.  The U.S. could see a new and 
potentially powerful arm of the military arise.  However, if these new contractors continue 
operate under murky structures devised outside of the normal chain of command, we could 
see the beginning of an era of PMCs whose only loyalty is to the highest bidder.  Indeed, 
PMCs “have worked for…rebel groups, drug cartels, and before 9/11, two al Qaeda-linked 
jihadist groups.”20  The current standard of allowing PMCs to fight without strict supervision 
and with relative impunity for their actions is a dangerous precedent.  We could potentially 
see a U.S. that is dependent on private armies to wage wars in a worst case scenario.  What 
we have witnessed with regard to one specific PMC, Blackwater, are soldiers who have the 
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authority to kill rooted not in the specific sanction of a legitimate authority, but in a private 
entity, be it a privately held business or a single person.   
It has been argued that there are compelling reasons “to require that non-state actors 
such as PMCs operate under the ‘legitimate authority’ of a state…”21  It is well understood 
that a PMC operates only when there is some actor with whom to contract.  The argument is 
that if a PMC is working on behalf of a state, even engaging in military operations, they 
could be justified legitimate authorities.22  This line of reasoning assumes that most states 
have “mechanisms for the internal discipline of those said to be acting on their behalf on the 
battlefield, and can thus hold them accountable for any unlawful or immoral conduct.”23  If 
only this could be true every time.  Again, with regard to Blackwater, it seems that the U.S. 
government has been reluctant to claim full jurisdictional authority for the actions of the 
firm.  Upon the investigation of the shooting of an Iraqi guard by a Blackwater employee, the 
question of legal jurisdiction was raised.  Erik Prince, co-founder of Blackwater, testified in 
front of the House Oversight Committee on the issue.  His comments are revealing: “We 
fired him.  We fined him.  But we, as a private organization, cannot do any more.   We 
cannot flog him.  We cannot incarcerate him.  That is up to the Justice Department.  We are 
not empowered to enforce U.S. law.”24  Prince was right.  In a stunning turn of events in this 
case, it was revealed that “The State Department…hoped to keep the case quiet by helping 
                                                 
21
 Heinze, “Private Military Companies,” in Heinze and Steele, Ethics, 136.   
 
22
 Ibid., 136.   
 
23
 Ibid., 136.  
 
24
 “Contractor involved in Iraq shooting got job in Kuwait,” CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/04/blackwater.contractor/.  
 
70 
 
Blackwater to take Mr. Moonen [the accused Blackwater employee] out of Iraq and by 
paying the slain guard’s family $20,000 in cash.”25  If the U.S. government is not going to 
hold these actors accountable for unlawful and immoral conduct, then it cannot be expected 
that other states, let alone non-state actors, will hold them accountable.  
With regard to considerations of security and order, the proliferation of PMCs 
operating outside of the command structure of the military of a legitimate authority and with 
relative impunity for their actions means that warfare can no longer be regulated.  As Sean 
Kay has presciently pointed out, the existence of contractors outside the control of states 
contributes to a lack of “accountability that military or intelligence personnel might have.”26  
The privatization of military force dramatically increases the number of actors able to use 
military force in the international arena.  This is exactly what Aquinas cautioned against.  
Clearly, entities such as Blackwater operate outside of the command and control of the U.S. 
military.  The increase of PMCs combined with less control over these entities increases the 
likelihood of instability.27  Further, PMCs operate not for goals of international security but 
rather out of a pure profit motive.  Evidence of this is found in PMCs’ willingness to sell 
themselves to the highest bidder.  Often times, this is not even a state.28  Even when PMCs 
are employed by a state, the evidence above suggests that they operate outside of a normal 
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chain of command and apart from state-based systems of regulation.  As a result of their 
ability to operate in secrecy, they provide a way for “governments to deploy military force 
without the blatancy of state action-for instance, by enabling foreign policy by proxy.”29  
And although a state that employs a PMC is still subject to international law, the PMCs 
themselves are not.30   
PMCs clearly must be rejected by the just war tradition’s conception of legitimate 
authority.  They operate with relatively little accountability for their actions.  Their over-all 
profit motive has led them to carry out military activity for other non-state actors outside of 
the confines of international law.  Further, the proliferation of entities outside of the 
command and control structure of state militaries undeniably contributes to the increase in 
the likelihood of international instability.  Thus, PMCs do not line up with classical just war 
conceptions of legitimate authority rooted in the moral and pragmatic concepts of order and 
security.  Although allowing them to continue to provide operational support to military 
efforts in the form of the base support outlined above is acceptable, they must not be allowed 
to engage in the use of military force in a security or training role.  In order that the just war 
tradition continue to be an accepted and revered authority on the moral limitations on the use 
of war, it must condemn the use of force of this type.  By nature PMCs present a challenge to 
the tradition of moral limitations in war.  The quickness, secrecy, and unaccountable way in 
which these actors can engage in the use of force are troubling aspects of twenty-first century 
warfare.  These entities must not be justified as legitimate authorities. 
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Terrorist Organizations 
Terrorism is an asymmetrical tactic used in the pursuit of a strategic objective.  It is a 
tool of the weak used in an attempt to “level the strategic playing field through dramatic and 
shocking political events.”31  By definition, terrorism targets innocent civilians without 
regard to discrimination in order to generate fear and achieve a political objective.32  Much 
like PMCs, terrorism as a tactic has been used for centuries, often by governments as a means 
of securing power amid internal uncertainties.33  Modern terrorism, however, is much 
different: the capacity for action has been revolutionized by twenty-first century technology.  
Moreover, modern terrorism is most often perpetrated by NSAs on an international scale.  
Common actors include: insurgents, guerilla movements, revolutionary groups and religious 
zealots.  With regard to insurgents, guerilla and revolutionary movements, the strategic 
rationale for terrorism appears to be the creation of “confusion, chaos, and fear to show that 
those in power cannot govern effectively.”34  Religiously motivated zealots, on the other 
hand, seek to project their nihilistic political philosophy on a specific region or even the 
world in an effort to more hastily usher in Armageddon.  Either way, the central tenet 
remains: those who perpetuate terrorism are unsatisfied with the existing international 
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political order and seek the establishment of an alternative order based around their specific 
principles and ideals. 
There is a well-documented history of the tactical and strategic use of terrorism as a 
political weapon.  For example, terror was used to restore order following the French 
Revolution.35  Yet, the dynamics of the global security environment in the twenty-first 
century have contributed to the dramatic proliferation of terrorism as a tactic and strategy of 
NSAs.  Many of the marvelous technological advances which have given rise to the benefits 
of globalization have also made it easier for terrorist organizations to coordinate and act.   
Transportation technology has given extremists virtually unlimited access to countries 
for use as either training or base-states or potential targets.  This is in addition to the use of 
transportation technology as a weapon such as the use of airliners as missiles on September 
11th or subway trains as transport mechanisms for bombs.  Communication technology has 
increasingly played the role of “force multiplier” aiding in the rapidity of “communications 
among members of an organization, and also as a means of publicizing via the media.”36  
Any AK 47-brandishing individual with access to the internet can upload a video of himself 
inciting hatred and spreading false information as an instantaneous tool of recruitment.  The 
use of the internet and cell phone technology has enabled terrorists to coordinate attacks 
more efficiently as well as update and adapt to changing circumstances in real-time.  Also, 
the traditional role of the state in the international economy has been weakened by its 
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deregulation.  This deregulation, while increasing the ease with which the flow of money is 
facilitated, has also helped the flow of weapons and the business of weapons-trading.37   
In addition to the role of technology as a catalyst for significant change in the global 
security environment, the proliferation of failed states has created a specific arena in which 
terrorist groups have been able to consolidate power and establish a base from which to 
launch international attacks.  The period of rapid decolonization following World War II 
simply left a number of states in key regions unprepared to make the transition to a stable 
government.  In the wake of weak or failed states, armed gangs or militias coalesced “into 
organized insurgent or guerilla movements seeking to consolidate power.”38  When a state 
fails or is on the brink of failure, an enormous power vacuum is created.  Obviously, a 
number of actors emerge as potential candidates for power holder in the next government.  
Thus weak, failing, or failed states are fertile ground for armed gangs or militias seeking to 
redress the existing power imbalance.  Terrorism is most often the tool used to promote fear, 
“intimidate civilians and harass or kill political opposition…” on the way to consolidating 
ultimate power.39  This prescription also rings true for states making the difficult transition 
toward democracy.  Terrorism is adopted by insurgent groups in these situations for 
essentially the same reasons, though the terror is often directed at international aid workers 
and those seeking to build civil institutions.  In this case, the objective “would be to create 
the circumstances in which outside forces withdraw, leaving a political and security vacuum 
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for insurgents to fill.”40  The 2006 insurgency in Iraq is a prime example.  Efforts of the U.S.-
led coalition suffered a serious set-back upon the adoption of terrorism by insurgent groups 
seeking to drive out coalition forces and consolidate power in the wake of the toppled 
Saddam Hussein regime. 
Further, the examples of the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab in 
Somalia demonstrate the raw capacity for action that these organizations can have as 
challengers to the international political order.  The Taliban and al-Qaeda grew together out 
of the anti-Soviet Mujahedeen movement in Afghanistan in the 1990s.  Late in the decade, 
the Taliban had consolidated their power and came to control most of Afghanistan.  The 
maniacal and puritanical Taliban regime harbored al-Qaeda, giving them a base from which 
to coordinate their attacks.  The training bases allowed by the Taliban regime trained as many 
as 100,000 fighters committed to holy war.41  Prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda was comprised of a 
remarkable military organization “including a high-level political committee which 
authorized actions.”42  Furthermore, al-Qaeda had a military committee, a finance committee, 
a foreign purchases committee, a security committee, and a public relations committee.43  
Each of these committees seems to have reported to the political committee for authorization 
of specific actions.  Al-Qaeda was involved in a number of terrorist attacks (and attempted 
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attacks) prior to 9/11.  In fact, al-Qaeda declared war on the United States in 1996.44  Al-
Qaeda was responsible for the 1993 effort to bring down the World Trade Center.  Several 
years later, al-Qaeda members attempted to blow up a number of airliners over the Pacific 
Ocean.  Fortunately, this plot was foiled in time.  In 1998, al-Qaeda operates killed hundreds 
of local African civilians when they attacked American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.45  
Other than 9/11, one of the most recognizable al-Qaeda attacks came in late 2000 when 
“members used a small boat to bring explosives alongside the USS Cole which was at harbor 
in Yemen, killing over a dozen soldiers and severely disabling the ship.”46 
Somalia represents one of the best examples of the growth of terrorist organizations 
out of the ruins of a failed state.  Unfortunately, Somalia has not had a central government 
since 1991.  In the wake of the large power vacuum created as a result, al-Shabaab has been 
able to “expand its footprint in Somalia.”47  In July 2011, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility 
for what was its first major attack outside of Somalia.  A pair of separate, but related, 
bombings killed more than seventy people in Uganda as they gathered to watch the World 
Cup final.48  These attacks point up the “internationalization of al-Shabaab’s terrorist 
activities, which could destabilize East Africa and unleash repercussions abroad.”49   
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However, while this was their first international attack, al-Shabaab has had success recruiting 
foreign fighters to its cause.  In May 2010, national security advisor John Brennan remarked 
that “We have seen an increasing number of individuals here in the United States become 
captivated by extremist ideologies or causes.”50  Specifically, Brennan noted five Somali-
Americans who fled to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab.  Shortly after Brennan’s remarks, 
two U.S. citizens from New Jersey were arrested at New York’s JFK airport over allegations 
that they planned to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.51  An unsettling observation by the 
Council on Foreign Relations has noted a growing trend “in which radicalized Americans 
have become involved in terrorism-related activities.”52 
Al-Shabaab has recently demonstrated a number of state-like capabilities, especially 
with regard to political behavior.  The organization has begun to reach out to the Somali 
public through a series of coordinated town visits.  In these outings, al-Shabaab would “hand 
out food and money to the poor, give criminals quick trials with mobile Sharia courts, and 
attempt to settle local disputes.”53  In a pragmatic and remarkably successful consolidation of 
power, al-Shabaab “has extended its political power in southern Somalia…” though non-
violent means.54  Yet, the over-arching ideology remains: “the group espouses a strict form of 
Islam, Salafi/Wahhabism, and websites for the group claim to be waging jihad against 
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infidels.”55  Despite relatively peaceful political activities, al-Shabaab continues to launch 
suicide terrorist attacks aimed at civilians and AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu.  In addition, 
the organization appears to be coordinating with the infamous Somali pirates in exchange for 
a share of the spoils.56  Piracy off the coast of Africa threatens to destabilize the flow of 
international trade in addition to providing a huge financial resource for al-Shabaab.57 
As challengers to the existing political order, terrorist organizations behave in an 
altogether different manner than that of states.  While there are specific examples of terrorist 
organizations exhibiting state-like behavior with regard to internal structures, the over-all 
goals of these organizations and the way in which they attempt to achieve them are far 
different and more troubling with regard to international order and security.58  One of the key 
differences between states and terrorist organizations with regard to the use of force has to do 
with intentions.   
When looking at capacity to act, states and terrorist organizations both have access to 
the unique features of the twenty-first century.  This was explored briefly above: 
transportation technology, communication, and finance.  In addition to this, it is well 
understood that modern war strategies and technologies have the capacity to bring 
destruction on a scale which has never been seen before.  While the technology for nuclear 
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weapons was developed in World War II, the threat of nuclear proliferation is one of the 
central problems of global security today.  For states which possess them, the principle of 
MAD virtually forbids their use.  To be sure, it is disconcerting that a maniacal leader such as 
Kim Jong Il possess nuclear weapons technology.  Yet, even he recognizes the use of that 
technology would bring about the destruction of his state.  As the leader of a state, survival 
remains his ultimate goal.  For example, Kim Jong Il has managed to parlay North Korea’s 
nuclear capabilities into international aid.59   The biggest potential threat of nuclear 
proliferation is that terrorist organizations will be given this technology.  Puritanical and 
apocalyptic groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, explicitly state their desire to bring 
about Armageddon and the end of the world.  It follows that the rules of MAD would not 
necessarily apply to them and there might not be any hesitation to use nuclear weapons.  The 
prolific use of suicide terrorism points out the fact that the rationality of survival does not 
apply to terrorists.   
In addition to the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons, military technology 
has advanced to the point that conventional aerial bombs and rockets are able to wreak 
considerable destruction.  One author has claimed that this blurs the line between states and 
terrorists due to the potential for civilian casualties and the perceived disregard for efforts on 
the part of states to limit them.  Upon lamenting how inexact the modern killing machine 
really is, Talal Asad claims that: “It is well known that aerial bombardment does not 
discriminate well between combatants and noncombatants, but it is wrong to think that this is 
due primarily to individual negligence rather than to the nature of modern military strategies 
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themselves.”60  It is quite an absurd claim.  While it remains true that modern military 
strategies are by nature incredibly destructive, the author fails to consider the development of 
precision guided munitions.  Examples of civilian deaths as a result of aerial bombardment 
have as much to do with operator error and bad guidance from troops on the ground as they 
do with the nature of the weapons themselves.  Furthermore, although civilian casualties are 
inherently a part of war, the advent of military technology has minimized this unfortunate 
reality considerably; states, not terrorist organizations have the technology and intent to limit 
the destructiveness of war.  The just war tradition does have something to say about this, in 
fact.  While the tradition does not preclude the killing of civilians, the invocation of the 
principle of double effect was introduced by Aquinas to limit it.   
Aquinas’s principle of double effect “is a way of reconciling the absolute prohibition 
against attacking non-combatants with the legitimate conduct of military activity.”61  This 
principle is driven by four conditions, the most important of which is as follows: “The 
intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is 
not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends.”62  In other words, in pursuit of the aims of 
order and security strategically and undertaking tactical operations in support of the strategic 
goal, civilian deaths can be accepted as long as every effort has been taken, up to the point of 
danger to the operator, to limit civilian casualties.  It is the very nature of the just war 
tradition, as it developed in antiquity and became codified in international law, to limit the 
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destructive nature of warfare.  In fact, this is the very reason that a conversation about the 
founding principles of the just war tradition is necessary in the first place.  It is more likely 
that states, for pragmatic as well as moral reasons, will adhere to these principles.  Terrorist 
organizations, on the other hand, by nature have no regard for this type of behavior.  They 
seek to overturn the existing international political climate characterized by security and 
order and defended by states.  While their growing capacity to act oftentimes mimics that of 
states, their intent, ultimate goals, and means through which they attempt to achieve those 
goals has a remarkably destabilizing effect on the international political order.   
Alternative standards by which to judge the how terrorist organizations could be 
incorporated into the just war tradition have been proposed.  Yet, they lack the proper 
grounding in just war’s founding principles.  The first of these alternatives was proposed by 
Andrew Valls.  Seeking to answer the penetrating question of “can terrorism be justified?”, 
Valls rejects the claim that all states are legitimate authorities because many of them do not 
“represent the interests and rights of [their] people.”63  The standard thus proposed by Valls 
for an evaluation of terrorists as legitimate authorities is a claim by the organization to 
represent the people and “also being seen by the people themselves as their representative.”64  
Using this standard, it is possible that terrorist organizations and other NSAs may be able to 
enjoy the status of legitimate authorities with the right to engage in the use of force.65 
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Another standard by which to judge NSAs, and terrorist organizations more 
specifically, was proposed by Michael Walzer.  Walzer argues in favor of the “political 
community” interpretation of legitimate authority.  States are morally valuable because it is 
within states that citizens can build their own political community.  Thus the state provides 
“an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won.”66  The 
interpretation is that this is the moral basis for states’ right to resort to war.  The logic here 
suggests that if “non-state entities can provide this same possibility for meaningful political 
community, then such entities may also at times have the right to wage war…”67   
The problem with these alternative standards is that they do not consider the intent 
and goals of terrorist organizations.  Be it insurgencies, guerilla and revolutionary 
movements, or religiously-driven groups, terrorists seek to overturn the existing political 
order.  The internal structure and/or potential opportunities provided to those under the 
control of a terrorist organization matter very little in terms of their ability to contribute to 
international security and order.  Furthermore, the more the principle of legitimate authority 
is diluted to incorporate actors which are incongruent with its tradition, the less likely it 
becomes that the just war tradition as a whole can have the desired effect of placing moral 
limitations on war.  Pragmatically, the more warfare is waged by private actors, the 
possibility for chaos and instability grows exponentially.  Security becomes harder to provide 
resulting in more conflict between states and NSAs and NSAs with other NSAs.  It is the 
responsibility of states as legitimate authorities to provide for the order and security of not 
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only their own domestic populations but also of the international system.  As a result, the just 
war tradition must reject terrorist organizations as legitimate authorities with the right to 
engage in the use of force.
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CHAPTER 5 
NATO AND LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
In light of the recent U.S.-led NATO efforts to enforce a no-fly-zone over Libya, it 
has become increasingly relevant to discuss how an international security organization such 
as NATO could fit into the just war tradition.  The challenge to the sovereignty of states in 
twenty-first century warfare has been outline above.  Yet, although NATO is simply a sum of 
state authority, it exercises the use of force as a unified entity which could present a 
challenge to the concept of legitimate authority.  The classical just war tradition vested 
legitimate authority in a single person.  Rightly or wrongly, this is no longer the case.  The 
concept of pooled authority such as that found in a security organization like NATO has 
quickly transformed the concept of state authority.  In this final chapter, I will critically 
examine NATO with the conception of authority in mind.  I will examine its over-all 
structure and decision-making process, seeking to discern how authority is wielded.  
Following this, the final section of this paper will attempt to reconcile this body with the 
conceptions of authority I have laid out above. 
What is NATO? 
NATO is an intergovernmental, trans-Atlantic political and military alliance.  It 
provides a framework for managing security challenges, links North American and European 
security interests and aims to build security through understanding and cooperation for the 
prevention of future conflict.  In the wake of the Second World War, ideological tensions 
between the countries of the west and the Soviet Union in the east were on the rise.  At this 
time, 12 countries from North America and Western Europe formed the North Atlantic 
Alliance.  From the onset, the primary aim was to create “a pact of mutual assistance” to 
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counter the rise of the Soviet Union and the risk of its extension into Eastern Europe and 
other parts of the continent.1  Militarily, the alliance is based on the principle of collective 
defense.  This commitment to a unified response in the defense of one is enshrined in Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty.  NATO is also politically engaged in the promotion of 
democracy in the region.  The establishment of democratic principles promotes trust, 
cooperation, and predictability, serving the over-all mission of conflict prevention.  While 
NATO has, in the past, sacrificed their commitment to these principles in the interest of 
geopolitical necessity, the promotion of democracy remains a hallmark of NATO action.2   
For our purposes, there are several dynamics of NATO which need to be considered.  
The first is NATO’s consensus decision-making.  NATO claims that one of the keys to its 
durability is its consensus-based decision-making process.  As I mentioned above, NATO is 
an intergovernmental body.  Intergovernmentalism is an application of a realist idea to the 
liberal concept of integration.  It is an approach to integration that treats states as the primary 
actors in the integration process.  NATO’s consensus decision-making process respects the 
sovereignty and independence of each member state.  All NATO decisions made have to be 
unanimous.  This means that when a decision is reached, “it has the full backing of all 
member countries and their commitment to implement it.”3   
The principal decision-making body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council.  As an 
intergovernmental body, the Council is the primary means through which member states 
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fight, squabble and pursue their national interests.  The Council meets at least once a week 
with each member state represented at the ambassadorial level.  Meetings at the Council also 
occur with various other representatives of each member state.  These representatives often 
include foreign ministers, defense ministers and heads of state and government.4  Within the 
NATO command structure, there are also numerous committees.  Like the council, each 
committee is made up of a representative from each member state.  Any decisions made at 
the committee level also require unanimity.  In addition to the Council, two defense-related 
bodies sit at the top of the complex web of committees: the Defense Planning Committee and 
the Nuclear Planning Group.5  Within this system, “the Military Committee is responsible for 
providing these three main bodies with military advice and gives the strategic commanders 
guidance on military matters.”6 
The head of the North Atlantic Council is the rotating position of Secretary General.  
The Secretary General is a senior international representative from one of the member states 
and is appointed for four years.  Responsibilities of this post include chairing “meetings of 
the North Atlantic Council and other important NATO bodies and help[ing] to build 
consensus among the members.”7 
Another dynamic is NATO’s military command structure.  Here, the principle of state 
sovereignty and independence also prevails.  NATO does not have armed forces of its own.  
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The forces available to NATO “remain under full national command and control until they 
are assigned by the member countries to undertake tasks…”8  Also, “all NATO members 
fund their own troops and military maintenance in all situations and at all locations.”9  The 
famed Article V, the Washington Treaty’s collective defense provision, does not, as is often 
assumed, require an automatic response by any of the member states.  In reality, Article V 
leaves the “precise actions taken by each Party subject to their sovereign decision, and this 
was the interpretation of those who supported Treaty ratification in 1949.”10 As such, a 
decision to commit forces to defend a NATO country against attack would still require 
approval within each member states’ constitutional framework.11  In short, NATO remains an 
organization of sovereign nation states.  For this reason, “no member can be compelled to 
participate in a military operation that it does not support.”12   
While NATO’s structure does protect and facilitate the sovereignty of its many 
member states, it continues to thrive as a result of the active commitment of those member 
states to pursue defense cooperation.  Specifically, when NATO engages in the use of force, 
it does so as a unified organization which complicates the issue of authority significantly.  
NATO’s use of force as a unified organization is only possible when forces are “assigned to a 
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specific operation decided upon at the political level.”13  Even then, member states still retain 
important controls over their military forces.  The forces available to NATO are delineated 
between those which come under operational command (OPCOM) and those under 
operational control (OPCON).14  These are military-specific terms which relate to the “nature 
of the authority exercised by military commanders over the forces assigned to them.”15  As 
such, when member states assign OPCOM or OPCON control, it places specific limits on the 
authority of the commanding NATO military officer at any given time. 
Specifically, OPCOM allows for a commander to “assign missions or tasks to 
subordinate commanders, to deploy units, and to retain operational and or tactical controls as 
may be deemed necessary.”16  This authority does not include responsibility for 
administration or logistics which is held by the respective member state.  OPCON allows a 
commander to direct forces assigned to accomplish specific missions or tasks “which are 
usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or 
assign tactical control to those units.”17  Authority not delegated at the OPCON level 
includes assigning separate employment of components of the units concerned or 
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administrative and logistic control.18  Tactical-level authority is also reserved to member 
states.  TACOM and TACON assign specific levels of authority to NATO commanders at the 
lower tactical-level of military operations.19 Member states retain the authority to assign 
forces on command and control levels as distinct from full command over all aspects of 
operations and administration of those forces.  
The final authority dynamic of NATO is the use of its Article V collective defense 
provision.  Within the just war tradition, the principle of just cause looms large.  There 
remains disagreement among just war theorists on the justness of certain casus belli, which 
tend to include the punishment of evil, recovery of stolen property, and righting of a wrong.  
Self defense against aggression is today the most widely agreed upon just cause.20  As article 
V is the embodiment of self defense against aggression, NATO’s use of force citing this 
clause is of no serious controversy.  The problem is that it has only been invoked once, after 
September 11th.  Historically, NATO has been active militarily in a number of missions.  Yet, 
on no previous occasion has NATO invoked Article V as a justification for its use of force.  
NATO’s first military mission was the 1995 air campaign in Bosnia Herzegovina.  This was 
an effort to compel an end to Serb-led violence.  In June 1999, NATO entered Kosovo to end 
wide-spread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster.  In both of these operations, NATO 
maintained forces to assist in the procurement of peace and stabilization.  Current NATO 
military operations include counter-piracy off the Horn of Africa and peace-keeping support 
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to the African Union.21  Humanitarian intervention remains a very controversial aspect of the 
just cause principle.  NATO boasts an impressive record of humanitarian intervention.  
Clearly, NATO has shown a willingness to act when others sit idly by.  NATO’s effort to 
adapt to twenty-first century conflict has been aimed specifically at non-Article V crisis 
response operations.  These include proliferation, failed states, piracy, energy supplies, 
terrorism, and climate change.22  The problem for NATO vis-à-vis the just war tradition is 
two-fold: questions regarding the principles of legitimate authority and just cause are raised 
by NATO’s international military action.  A lack of consensus on the definition of legitimate 
authority and the controversy over humanitarian intervention as satisfactory for the principle 
of just cause need to be reconciled. 
It should be recognized by now that the problem lies not within NATO, other 
international organizations, and non-state actors.  Rather, the lack of accommodation of these 
entities into the just war tradition harms its salience as a set of moral and ethical principles 
for those seeking to engage in the use of force.  Because war is an unfortunate reality, there 
must be some framework to manage its conduct.  However, this framework needs to reflect 
the reality of current international conflict.  NATO is an important international actor.  In 
addition to its collective response to the US invasion of Afghanistan, NATO continues to 
enforce peace and uphold security in troubled regions.  There is no question that it remains a 
global force for justice, peace, and order.  For this reason, NATO as an entity satisfies the 
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requirement of a legitimate authority laid out by formative just war thinkers above.  While 
NATO does not receive its legitimate authority directly from God, its actions in pursuit of 
peace and security are aligned with the actions of the sovereign in defense of the common 
weal.   
This aspect of legitimate authority needs to be re-incorporated into the just war 
tradition.  The addition of this standard would help to stymie the recent diminution of the 
authority principle.  There is no question that just war needs to accommodate new and 
disparate actors.  Yet, this can be done without accommodating all new and disparate actors.  
While terrorist organizations may be able to meet a new standard of authority such as an 
entity seeking to affect governance in a particular region, it would fail to align with the 
additional standard of seeking to affect peace, justice, order and eliminate chaos and 
individual reprisals.   
This is a complicated and controversial topic.  I have only begun to scratch the 
surface.  If the just war tradition is to retain its salience, it must evolve to incorporate twenty-
first century conflict.  Ironically, this evolution should incorporate the standards espoused by 
some of just wars most formative thinkers.  As a global force for peace, justice, and order, 
NATO satisfies this traditional requirement of a legitimate authority.   
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have attempted to build a framework for further debate in an effort to 
update the just war tradition to meet changes in international relations.  The statist paradigm 
of international relations is being challenged by non-state actors engaging in the use of force 
with more frequency than that of states.  Recent just war scholarship has attempted a 
reconciliation of the principle of legitimate authority.  These applications have, 
unfortunately, diluted the efficacy of one of just war’s most important principles.  The 
changing nature of twenty-first century international relations presents just war scholars with 
the unique opportunity to continue the salience of just war thinking.  The just war tradition 
“has been useful in calling leaders and strategists to consider their ideals when confronted 
with the necessity of violence.”23  In order that we may preserve the ideals and values that 
structure the way of life that we hold so dear, the just war tradition must remain a central 
aspect of the use of military force against threats to their future. 
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